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Web Security

Archived content. No warranty is made as to technical accuracy. Content may contain URLs that were valid when originally published, but now link to sites or pages that no longer exist.

by William Stallings

Chapter 14 from Cryptography and Network Security : Principles and Practice, Second Edition , published by Prentice Hall

Use your mentality

Wake up to reality

—From the song "I've Got You under My Skin,"

by Cole Porter

Virtually all businesses, most government agencies, and many individuals now have Web sites. The number of individuals and companies with Internet access is expanding rapidly, and all of these have graphical Web browsers. As a result, businesses are enthusiastic about setting up facilities on the Web for electronic commerce. But the reality is that the Internet and the Web are extremely vulnerable to compromises of various sorts. As businesses wake up to this reality, the demand for secure Web services grows.

The topic of Web security is a broad one and can easily fill a book (several are recommended at the end of this chapter). In this chapter, we begin with a discussion of the general requirements for Web security and then focus on two standardized schemes that are becoming increasingly important as part of Web commerce: SSL/TLS and SET.

On This Page

14.1 Web Security Considerations
14.2 Secure Socket Layer And Transport Layer Security
14.3 Secure Electronic Transaction
14.4 Recommended Reading
14.5 Problems

14.1 Web Security Considerations

The World Wide Web is fundamentally a client/server application running over the Internet and TCP/IP intranets. As such, the security tools and approaches discussed so far in this book are relevant to the issue of Web security. But, as pointed out in [GARF97], the Web presents new challenges not generally appreciated in the context of computer and network security:

  • The Internet is two way. Unlike traditional publishing environments, even electronic publishing systems involving teletext, voice response, or fax-back, the Web is vulnerable to attacks on the Web servers over the Internet.

  • The Web is increasingly serving as a highly visible outlet for corporate and product information and as the platform for business transactions. Reputations can be damaged and money can be lost if the Web servers are subverted.

  • Although Web browsers are very easy to use, Web servers are relatively easy to configure and manage, and Web content is increasingly easy to develop, the underlying software is extraordinarily complex. This complex software may hide many potential security flaws. The short history of the Web is filled with examples of new and upgraded systems, properly installed, that are vulnerable to a variety of security attacks.

  • A Web server can be exploited as a launching pad into the corporation's or agency's entire computer complex. Once the Web server is subverted, an attacker may be able to gain access to data and systems not part of the Web itself but connected to the server at the local site.

  • Casual and untrained (in security matters) users are common clients for Web-based services. Such users are not necessarily aware of the security risks that exist and do not have the tools or knowledge to take effective countermeasures.

Web Security Threats

Table 14.1 A Comparison of Threats on the Web

Threats

Consequences

Countermeasures

Integrity

· Modification of user data
Trojan horse browser
· Modification of memory
· Modification of message traffic in transit

· Loss of information
· Compromise of machine
· Vulnerability to all other threats

Cryptographic checksums

Confidentiality

· Eavesdropping on the Net
· Theft of info from server
· Theft of data from client
· Info about network configuration
· Info about which client talks to server

· Loss of information
· Loss of privacy

Encryption, Web proxies

Denial of Service

· Killing of user threads
· Flooding machine with bogus threats
· Filling up disk or memory
· Isolating machine by DNS attacks

· Disruptive
· Annoying
· Prevent user from getting work done

Difficult to prevent

Authentication

· Impersonation of legitimate users
· Data forgery

· Misrepresentation of user
· Belief that false information is valid

Cryptographic techniques

Table 14.1 provides a summary of the types of security threats faced in using the Web. One way to group these threats is in terms of passive and active attacks. Passive attacks include eavesdropping on network traffic between browser and server and gaining access to information on a Web site that is supposed to be restricted. Active attacks include impersonating another user, altering messages in transit between client and server, and altering information on a Web site.

Another way to classify Web security threats is in terms of the location of the threat: Web server, Web browser, and network traffic between browser and server. Issues of server and browser security fall into the category of computer system security; Part Four of this book addresses the issue of system security in general but is also applicable to Web system security. Issues of traffic security fall into the category of network security and are addressed in this chapter.

Web Traffic Security Approaches

A number of approaches to providing Web security are possible. The various approaches that have been considered are similar in the services they provide and, to some extent, in the mechanisms that they use, but they differ with respect to their scope of applicability and their relative location within the TCP/IP protocol stack.

Cc767139.f14-1(en-us,TechNet.10).gif

Figure 14: illustrates this difference. One way to provide Web security is to use IP Security (Figure 14.1a). The advantage of using IPSec is that it is transparent to end users and applications and provides a general-purpose solution. Further, IPSec includes a filtering capability so that only selected traffic need incur the overhead of IPSec processing.

Another relatively general-purpose solution is to implement security just above TCP (Figure 14.1b). The foremost example of this approach is the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and the follow-on Internet standard of SSL known as Transport Layer Security (TLS). At this level, there are two implementation choices. For full generality, SSL (or TLS) could be provided as part of the underlying protocol suite and therefore be transparent to applications. Alternatively, SSL can be embedded in specific packages. For example, Netscape and Microsoft Explorer browsers come equipped with SSL, and most Web servers have implemented the protocol.

Application-specific security services are embedded within the particular application. Figure 14.1c shows examples of this architecture. The advantage of this approach is that the service can be tailored to the specific needs of a given application. In the context of Web security, an important example of this approach is Secure Electronic Transaction (SET).

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of SSL/TLS and SET.

14.2 Secure Socket Layer And Transport Layer Security

SSL was originated by Netscape. Version 3 of the protocol was designed with public review and input from industry and was published as an Internet draft document. Subsequently, when a consensus was reached to submit the protocol for Internet standardization, the TLS working group was formed within IETF to develop a common standard. The current work on TLS is aimed at producing an initial version as an Internet Standard. This first version of TLS can be viewed as essentially an SSLv3.1 and is very close to and backward compatible with SSLv3.

The bulk of this section is devoted to a discussion of SSLv3. At the end of the section, the key differences between SSLv3 and TLS are described.

SSL Architecture

Cc767139.f14-2(en-us,TechNet.10).gif

SSL is designed to make use of TCP to provide a reliable end-to-end secure service. SSL is not a single protocol but rather two layers of protocols, as illustrated in Figure 14.2.

The SSL Record Protocol provides basic security services to various higher-layer protocols. In particular, the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), which provides the transfer service for Web client/server interaction, can operate on top of SSL. Three higher-layer protocols are defined as part of SSL: the Handshake Protocol, the Change Cipher Spec Protocol, and the Alert Protocol. These SSL-specific protocols are used in the management of SSL exchanges and are examined later in this section.

Two important SSL concepts are the SSL session and the SSL connection, which are defined in the specification as follows:

  • Connection: A connection is a transport (in the OSI layering model definition) that provides a suitable type of service. For SSL, such connections are peer-to-peer relationships. The connections are transient. Every connection is associated with one session.

  • Session: An SSL session is an association between a client and a server. Sessions are created by the Handshake Protocol. Sessions define a set of cryptographic security parameters, which can be shared among multiple connections. Sessions are used to avoid the expensive negotiation of new security parameters for each connection.

Between any pair of parties (applications such as HTTP on client and server), there may be multiple secure connections. In theory, there may also be multiple simultaneous sessions between parties, but this feature is not used in practice.

There are actually a number of states associated with each session. Once a session is established, there is a current operating state for both read and write (i.e., receive and send). In addition, during the Handshake Protocol, pending read and write states are created. Upon successful conclusion of the Handshake Protocol, the pending states become the current states.

A session state is defined by the following parameters (definitions from the SSL specification):

  • Session identifier: An arbitrary byte sequence chosen by the server to identify an active or resumable session state.

  • Peer certificate: An X509.v3 certificate of the peer. This element of the state may be null.

  • Compression method: The algorithm used to compress data prior to encryption.

  • Cipher spec: Specifies the bulk data encryption algorithm (such as null, DES, etc.) and a hash algorithm (such as MD5 or SHA-1) used for MAC calculation. It also defines cryptographic attributes such as the hash_size.

  • Master secret: Forty-eight-byte secret shared between the client and server.

  • Is resumable: A flag indicating whether the session can be used to initiate new connections.

A connection state is defined by the following parameters:

  • Server and client random: Byte sequences that are chosen by the server and client for each connection.

  • Server write MAC secret: The secret key used in MAC operations on data sent by the server.

  • Client write MAC secret: The secret key used in MAC operations on data sent by the client.

  • Server write key: The conventional encryption key for data encrypted by the server and decrypted by the client.

  • Client write key: The conventional encryption key for data encrypted by the client and decrypted by the server.

  • Initialization vectors: When a block cipher in CBC mode is used, an initialization vector (IV) is maintained for each key. This field is first initialized by the SSL Handshake Protocol. Thereafter the final ciphertext block from each record is preserved for use as the IV with the following record.

  • Sequence numbers: Each party maintains separate sequence numbers for transmitted and received messages for each connection. When a party sends or receives a change cipher spec message, the appropriate sequence number is set to zero. Sequence numbers may not exceed 264 2 1.

SSL Record Protocol

The SSL Record Protocol provides two services for SSL connections:

  • Confidentiality: The Handshake Protocol defines a shared secret key that is used for conventional encryption of SSL payloads.

  • Message Integrity: The Handshake Protocol also defines a shared secret key that is used to form a message authentication code (MAC).

Figure 14.3 indicates the overall operation of the SSL Record Protocol. The Record Protocol takes an application message to be transmitted, fragments the data into manageable blocks, optionally compresses the data, applies a MAC, encrypts, adds a header, and transmits the resulting unit in a TCP segment. Received data are decrypted, verified, decompressed, and reassembled and then delivered to higher-level users.

Cc767139.f14-3(en-us,TechNet.10).gif

The first step is fragmentation. Each upper-layer message is fragmented into blocks of 214 bytes (16384 bytes) or less. Next, compression is optionally applied. Compression must be lossless and may not increase the content length by more than 1024 bytes. (Of course, one hopes that compression shrinks rather than expands the data. However, for very short blocks, it is possible, because of formatting conventions, that the compression algorithm will actually provide output that is longer than the input.) In SLLv3 (as well as the current version of TLS), no compression algorithm is specified, so the default compression algorithm is null.

The next step in processing is to compute a message authentication code over the compressed data. For this purpose, a shared secret key is used. The calculation is defined as follows:

hash(MAC_write_secret || pad_2 ||

hash(MAC_write_secret || pad_1|| seq_num ||SSL Compressed.type ||

SSLCompressed.length || SSLCompressed.fragment))

Where

||

=

concatenation

MAC_write_secret

=

shared secret key

hash

=

cryptographic hash algorithm; either MD5 or SHA-1

pad_1

=

the byte 0x36 (0011 0110) repeated 48 times (384 bits) for MD5 and 40 times (320 bits) for SHA-1

pad_2

=

the byte 0x5C (0101 1100) repeated 48 times for MD5 and 40 times for SHA-1

seq_num

=

the sequence number for this message

SSLCompressed.type

=

the higher-level protocol used to process this fragment

SSLCompressed.length

=

the length of the compressed fragment

SSLCompressed.fragment

=

the compressed fragment (if compression is not used, the plaintext fragment)

Note that this is very similar to the HMAC algorithm defined in Chapter 9. The difference is that the two pads are concatenated in SSLv3 and are XORed in HMAC. The SSLv3 MAC algorithm is based on the original internet draft for HMAC, which used concatenation. The final version of HMAC, defined in RFC 2104, uses the XOR.

Next, the compressed message plus the MAC are encrypted using symmetric encryption. Encryption may not increase the content length by more than 1024 bytes, so that the total length may not exceed 214 1 2048. The following encryption algorithms are permitted:

Block Cipher

Stream Cipher

 

 

Algorithm

Key Size

Algorithm

Key Size

IDEA

128

RC4-40

40

RC2-40

40

RC4-128

128

DES-40

40

 

 

DES

56

 

 

3DES

168

 

 

Fortezza

80

 

 

Fortezza can be used in a smart card encryption scheme.

For stream encryption, the compressed message plus the MAC are encrypted. Note that the MAC is computed before encryption takes place and that the MAC is then encrypted along with the plaintext or compressed plaintext.

For block encryption, padding may be added after the MAC prior to encryption. The padding is in the form of a number of padding bytes followed by a 1-byte indication of the length of the padding. The total amount of padding is the smallest amount such that the total size of the data to be encrypted (plaintext plus MAC plus padding) is a multiple of the cipher's block length. An example is a plaintext (or compressed text if compression is used) of 58 bytes, with a MAC of 20 bytes (using SHA-1), that is encrypted using a block length of 8 bytes (e.g., DES). With the padding.length byte, this yields a total of 79 bytes. To make the total an integer mutiple of 8, one byte of padding is added.

The final step of SSL Record Protocol processing is to prepend a header, consisting of the following fields:

  • Content Type (8 bits): The higher-layer protocol used to process the enclosed fragment.

  • Major Version (8 bits): Indicates major version of SSL in use. For SSLv3, the value is 3.

  • Minor Version (8 bits): Indicates minor version in use. For SSLv3, the value is 0.

  • Compressed length (16 bits): The length in bytes of the plaintext fragment (or compressed fragment if compression is used). The maximum value is 214 1 2048.

The content types that have been defined are change_cipher_spec, alert, handshake, and application_data. The first three are the SSL-specific protocols, discussed next. Note that no distinction is made among the various applications (e.g., HTTP) that might use SSL; the content of the data created by such applications is opaque to SSL.

Figure 14.4 illustrates the SSL record format.

Cc767139.f14-4(en-us,TechNet.10).gif

Change Cipher Spec Protocol

The Change Cipher Spec Protocol is one of the three SSL-specific protocols that use the SSL Record Protocol, and it is the simplest. This protocol consists of a single message (Figure 14.5a), which consists of a single byte with the value 1. The sole purpose of this message is to cause the pending state to be copied into the current state, which updates the cipher suite to be used on this connection.

Alert Protocol

The Alert Protocol is used to convey SSL-related alerts to the peer entity. As with other applications that use SSL, alert messages are compressed and encrypted, as specified by the current state.

Each message in this protocol consists of two bytes (Figure 14.5b). The first byte takes the value warning(1) or fatal(2) to convey the severity of the message. If the level is fatal, SSL immediately terminates the connection. Other connections on the same session may continue, but no new connections on this session may be established. The second byte contains a code that indicates the specific alert. First, we list those alerts that are always fatal (as defined in the SSL specification):

  • unexpected_message: An inappropriate message was received.

  • bad_record_mac: An incorrect MAC was received.

  • decompression_failure: The decompression function received improper input (e.g., unable to decompress or decompress to greater than maximum allowable length).

  • handshake_failure: Sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available.

  • illegal_parameter: A field in a handshake message was out of range or inconsistent with other fields.

Cc767139.f14-5(en-us,TechNet.10).gif

The remainder of the alerts are the following:

  • close_notify: Notifies the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this connection. Each party is required to send a close_notify alert before closing the write side of a connection.

  • no_certificate: May be sent in response to a certificate request if no appropriate certificate is available.

  • bad_certificate: A received certificate was corrupt (e.g., contained a signature that did not verify).

  • unsupported_certificate: The type of the received certificate is not supported.

  • certificate_revoked: A certificate has been revoked by its signer.

  • certificate_expired: A certificate has expired.

  • certificate_unknown: Some other unspecified issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it unacceptable.

Handshake Protocol

The most complex part of SSL is the Handshake Protocol. This protocol allows the server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate an encryption and MAC algorithm and cryptographic keys to be used to protect data sent in an SSL record. The handshake protocol is used before any application data is transmitted.

The Handshake Protocol consists of a series of messages exchanged by client and server. All of these have the format shown in Figure 14.5c. Each message has three fields:

  • Type (1 byte): Indicates one of 10 messages. Table 14.2 lists the defined message types.

  • Length (3 bytes): The length of the message in bytes.

  • Content ($ 1 byte): The parameters associated with this message; these are listed in Table 14.2.

Table 14.2 SSL Handshake Protocol Message Types

Message Type

Parameters

hello_request

null

client_hello

version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression method

server_hello

version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression method

certificate

chain of X.509v3 certificates

server_key_exchange

parameters, signature

certificate_request

type, authorities

server_done

null

certificate_verify

signature

client_key_exchange

parameters, signature

finished

hash value

Figure 14.6 shows the initial exchange needed to establish a logical connection between client and server. The exchange can be viewed as having four phases.

Cc767139.f14-6(en-us,TechNet.10).gif

Phase 1. Establish Security Capabilities

This phase is used to initiate a logical connection and to establish the security capabilities that will be associated with it. The exchange is initiated by the client, which sends a client_hello message with the following parameters:

  • Version: The highest SSL version understood by the client.

  • Random: A client-generated random structure, consisting of a 32-bit timestamp and 28 bytes generated by a secure random number generator. These values serve as nonces and are used during key exchange to prevent replay attacks.

  • Session ID: A variable-length session identifier. A nonzero value indicates that the client wishes to update the parameters of an existing connection or create a new connection on this session. A zero value indicates that the client wishes to establish a new connection on a new session.

  • CipherSuite: This is a list that contains the combinations of cryptographic algorithms supported by the client, in decreasing order of preference. Each element of the list (each cipher suite) defines both a key exchange algorithm and a CipherSpec; these are discussed subsequently.

  • Compression Method: This is a list of the compression methods the client supports.

After sending the client_hello message, the client waits for the server_hello message, which contains the same parameters as the client_hello message. For the server_hello message, the following conventions apply. The Version field contains the lower of the version suggested by the client and the highest supported by the server. The Random field is generated by the server and is independent of the client's Random field. If the SessionID field of the client was nonzero, the same value is used by the server; otherwise the server's SessionID field contains the value for a new session. The CipherSuite field contains the single cipher suite selected by the server from those proposed by the client. The Compression field contains the compression method selected by the server from those proposed by the client.

The first element of the Cipher Suite parameter is the key exchange method (i.e., the means by which the cryptographic keys for conventional encryption and MAC are exchanged). The following key exchange methods are supported:

  • RSA: The secret key is encrypted with the receiver's RSA public key. A public-key certificate for the receiver's key must be made available.

  • Fixed Diffie-Hellman: This is a Diffie-Hellman key exchange in which the server's certificate contains the Diffie-Hellman public parameters signed by the certificate authority (CA). That is, the public-key certificate contains the Diffie-Hellman public-key parameters. The client provides its Diffie-Hellman public key parameters either in a certificate, if client authentication is required, or in a key exchange message.

  • Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman: This technique is used to create ephemeral (temporary, one-time) secret keys. In this case, the Diffie-Hellman public keys are exchanged, signed using the sender's private RSA or DSS key. The receiver can use the corresponding public key to verify the signature. Certificates are used to authenticate the public keys. This would appear to be the most secure of the three Diffie-Hellman options because it results in a temporary, authenticated key.

  • Anonymous Diffie-Hellman: The base Diffie-Hellman algorithm is used, with no authentication. That is, each side sends its public Diffie-Hellman parameters to the other, with no authentication. This approach is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, in which the attacker conducts anonymous Diffie-Hellman with both parties.

  • Fortezza: The technique defined for the Fortezza scheme.

Following the definition of a key exchange method is the CipherSpec, which includes the following fields:

  • CipherAlgorithm: Any of the algorithms mentioned earlier: RC4, RC2, DES, 3DES, DES40, IDEA, Fortezza

  • MACAlgorithm: MD5 or SHA-1

  • CipherType: Stream or Block

  • IsExportable: True or False

  • HashSize: 0, 16 (for MD5), or 20 (for SHA-1) bytes

  • Key Material: A sequence of bytes that contain data used in generating the write keys

  • IV Size: The size of the Initialization Value for Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption

Phase 2. Server Authentication and Key Exchange

The server begins this phase by sending its certificate, if it needs to be authenticated; the message contains one or a chain of X.509 certificates. The certificate message is required for any agreed-on key exchange method except anonymous Diffie-Hellman. Note that if fixed Diffie-Hellman is used, this certificate message functions as the server's key exchange message because it contains the server's public Diffie-Hellman parameters.

Next, a server_key_exchange message may be sent if it is required. It is not required in two instances: (1) The server has sent a certificate with fixed Diffie-Hellman parameters, or (2) RSA key exchange is to be used. The server_key_exchange message is needed for the following:

  • Anonymous Diffie-Hellman: The message content consists of the two global Diffie-Hellman values (a prime number and a primitive root of that number) plus the server's public Diffie-Hellman key (see Figure 6.16),

  • Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman: The message content includes the three Diffie-Hellman parameters provided for anonymous Diffie-Hellman, plus a signature of those parameters.

  • RSA key exchange, in which the server is using RSA but has a signature-only RSA key: Accordingly, the client cannot simply send a secret key encrypted with the server's public key. Instead, the server must create a temporary RSA public/private key pair and use the server_key_exchange message to send the public key. The message content includes the two parameters of the temporary RSA public key (exponent and modulus; see Figure 6.5) plus a signature of those parameters.

  • Fortezza

Some further details about the signatures are warranted. As usual, a signature is created by taking the hash of a message and encrypting it with the sender's public key. In this case the hash is defined as

     hash(ClientHello.random || ServerHello.random || ServerParams)

So the hash covers not only the Diffie-Hellman or RSA parameters, but also the two nonces from the initial hello messages. This ensures against replay attacks and misrepresentation. In the case of a DSS signature, the hash is performed using the SHA-1 algorithm. In the case of an RSA signature, both an MD5 and an SHA-1 hash are calculated, and the concatenation of the two hashes (36 bytes) is encrypted with the server's public key.

Next, a nonanonymous server (server not using anonymous Diffie-Hellman) can request a certificate from the client. The certificate_request message includes two parameters: certificate_type and certificate_authorities. The certificate type indicates the public-key algorithm and its use:

  • RSA, signature only

  • DSS, signature only

  • RSA for fixed Diffie-Hellman; in this case the signature is used only for authentication, by sending a certificate signed with RSA

  • DSS for fixed Diffie-Hellman; again, used only for authentication

  • RSA for ephemeral Diffie-Hellman

  • DSS for ephemeral Diffie-Hellman

  • Fortezza

The second parameter in the certificate_request message is a list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate authorities.

The final message in Phase 2, and one that is always required, is the server_done message, which is sent by the server to indicate the end of the server hello and associated messages. After sending this message, the server will wait for a client response. This message has no parameters.

Phase 3. Client Authentication and Key Exchange

Upon receipt of the server_done message, the client should verify that the server provided a valid certificate if required and check that the server_hello parameters are acceptable. If all is satisfactory, the client sends one or more messages back to the server.

If the server has requested a certificate, the client begins this phase by sending a certificate message. If no suitable certificate is available, the client sends a no_certificate alert instead.

Next is the client_key_exchange message, which must be sent in this phase. The content of the message depends on the type of key exchange, as follows:

  • RSA: The client generates a 48-byte pre-master secret and encrypts with the public key from the server's certificate or temporary RSA key from a server_key_exchange message. Its use to compute a master secret is explained later.

  • Ephemeral or Anonymous Diffie-Hellman: The client's public Diffie-Hellman parameters are sent.

  • Fixed Diffie-Hellman: The client's public Diffie-Hellman parameters were sent in a certificate message, so the content of this message is null.

  • Fortezza: The client's Fortezza parameters are sent.

Finally, in this phase, the client may send a certificate_verify message to provide explicit verification of a client certificate. This message is only sent following any client certificate that has signing capability (i.e., all certificates except those containing fixed Diffie-Hellman parameters). This message signs a hash code based on the preceding messages, defined as follows:

CertificateVerify.signature.md5_hash
          MD5(master_secret || pad_2 || MD5(handshake_messages || master_secret || pad_1));
Certificate.signature.sha_hash
          SHA(master_secret || pad_2 || SHA(handshake_messages || master_secret || pad_1));

where pad_1 and pad_2 are the values defined earlier for the MAC, handshake_ messages refers to all Handshake Protocol messages sent or received starting at client_hello but not including this message, and master_secret is the calculated secret whose construction is explained later in this section. If the user's private key is DSS, then it is used to encrypt the SHA-1 hash. If the user's private key is RSA, it is used to encrypt the concatenation of the MD5 and SHA-1 hashes. In either case, the purpose is to verify the client's ownership of the private key for the client certificate. Even if someone is misusing the client's certificate, he or she would be unable to send this message.

Phase 4. Finish

This phase completes the setting up of a secure connection. The client sends a change_cipher_spec message and copies the pending CipherSpec into the current CipherSpec. Note that this message is not considered part of the Handshake Protocol but is sent using the Change Cipher Spec Protocol. The client then immediately sends the finished message under the new algorithms, keys, and secrets. The finished message verifies that the key exchange and authentication processes were successful. The content of the finished message is the concatenation of two hash values:

MD5(master_secret || pad_2 || MD5(handshake_messages || Sender || master_secret || pad_1))

SHA(master_secret || pad_2 || SHA(handshake_messages || Sender || master_secret || pad_1))

where Sender is a code that identifies that the sender is the client and handshake_ messages is all of the data from all handshake messages up to but not including this message.

In response to these two messages, the server sends its own change_cipher_spec message, transfers the pending to the current CipherSpec, and sends its finished message. At this point the handshake is complete and the client and server may begin to exchange application layer data.

Cryptographic Computations

Two further items are of interest: the creation of a shared master secret by means of the key exchange, and the generation of cryptographic parameters from the master secret.

Master Secret Creation

The shared master secret is a one-time 48-byte value (384 bits) generated for this session by means of secure key exchange. The creation is in two stages. First, a pre_master_secret is exchanged. Second, the master_secret is calculated by both parties. For pre_master_secret exchange, there are two possibilities:

  • RSA: A 48-byte pre_master_secret is generated by the client, encrypted with the server's public RSA key, and sent to the server. The server decrypts the ciphertext using its private key to recover the pre_master_secret.

  • Diffie-Hellman: Both client and server generate a Diffie-Hellman public key. After these are exchanged, each side performs the Diffie-Hellman calculation to create the shared pre_master_secret.

Both sides now compute the master_secret as follows:

master_secret = MD5(pre_master_secret || SHA('A' || pre_master_secret ||
                     ClientHello.random || ServerHello.Random)) ||
                MD5(pre_master_secret || SHA('BB' || pre_Master_secret ||
                     ClientHello.random || ServerHello.Random)) ||
                MD5(pre_master_secret || SHA('CCC' || pre_Master_secret ||
                     ClientHello.random || ServerHello.Random)) ||

where ClientHello.random and ServerHello.random are the two nonce values exchanged in the initial hello messages.

Generation of Cryptographic Parameters

CipherSpecs require a client write MAC secret, a server write MAC secret, a client write key, a server write key, a client write IV, and a server write IV, which are generated from the master secret in that order. These parameters are generated from the master secret by hashing the master secret into a sequence of secure bytes of sufficient length for all needed parameters.

The generation of the key material from the master secret uses the same format for generation of the master secret from the pre-master secret:

key_block = MD5(pre_master_secret || SHA('A' || pre_master_secret ||
                   ServerHello.random || ClientHello.Random)) ||
             MD5(pre_master_secret || SHA('BB' || pre_Master_secret ||
                   ServerHello.random || ClientHello.Random)) ||
             MD5(pre_master_secret || SHA('CCC' || pre_Master_secret ||
                   ServerHello.random || ClientHello.Random)) || …

until enough output has been generated. The result of this algorithmic structure is a pseudorandom function. We can view the master_secret as the pseudorandom seed value to the function. The client and server random numbers can be viewed as salt values to complicate cryptanalysis (see Chapter 15 for a discussion of the use of salt values).

Transport Layer Security

TLS is an IETF standardization initiative whose goal is to produce an Internet standard version of SSL. The current draft version of TLS is very similar to SSLv3. In this section, we highlight the differences.

Version Number

The TLS Record Format is the same as that of the SSL Record Format (Figure 14.4), and the fields in the header have the same meanings. The one difference is in version values. For the current draft of TLS, the Major Version is 3 and the Minor Version is 1.

Message Authentication Code

There are two differences between the SSLv3 and TLS MAC schemes: the actual algorithm and the scope of the MAC calculation. TLS makes use of the HMAC algorithm defined in RFC 2104. HMAC is defined as follows:

HMACK = H[(K+ Å opad) || H[(K+Å ipad) || M]]

where

H

=

embedded hash function (for TLS, either MD5 or SHA-1)

M

=

message input to HMAC

K+

=

secret key padded with zeros on the left so that the result is equal to the block length of the hash code (for MD5 and SHA-1, block length = 512 bits)

ipad

=

00110110 (36 in hexadecimal) repeated 64 times (512 bits)

opad

=

01011100 (5C in hexadecimal) repeated 64 times (512 bits)

SSLv3 uses the same algorithm, except that the padding bytes are concatenated with the secret key rather than being XORed with the secret key padded to the block length. The level of security should be about the same in both cases.

For TLS, the MAC calculation encompasses the fields indicated in the following expression:

HMAC_hash(MAC_write_secret, seq_num || TLSCompressed.type || 
          TLSCompressed.version || TLSCompressed.length || TLSCompressed.fragment))

The MAC calculation covers all of the fields covered by the SSLv3 calculation, plus the field TLSCompressed.version, which is the version of the protocol being employed.

Pseudorandom Function

TLS makes use of a pseudorandom function referred to as PRF to expand secrets into blocks of data for purposes of key generation or validation. The objective is to make use of a relatively small shared secret value but to generate longer blocks of data in a way that is secure from the kinds of attacks made on hash functions and MACs. The PRF is based on the following data expansion function (Figure 14.7):

     P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) || seed) ||
                            HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) || seed) ||
                            HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) || seed) || . . .

where A() is defined as

A(0)

=

seed

A(i)

=

HMAC_hash(secret, A(I-1))

The data expansion function makes use of the HMAC algorithm, with either MD5 or SHA-1 as the underlying hash function. As can be seen, P_hash can be iterated as many times as necessary to produce the required quantity of data. For example, if P_SHA-1 was used to generate 64 bytes of data, it would have to be iterated four times, producing 80 bytes of data, of which the last 16 would be discarded. In this case, P_MD5 would also have to be iterated four times, producing exactly 64 bytes of data. Note that each iteration involves two executions of HMAC, each of which in turn involves two executions of the underlying hash algorithm.

Cc767139.f14-7(en-us,TechNet.10).gif

To make PRF as secure as possible, it uses two hash algorithms in a way that should guarantee its security if either algorithm remains secure. PRF is defined as

PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label || seed) Å P_SHA-1(S2, label || seed)

PRF takes as input a secret value, an identifying label, and a seed value and produces an output of arbitrary length. The output is created by splitting the secret value into two halves (S1 and S2) and performing P_hash on each half, using MD5 on one half and SHA on the other half. The two results are exclusive-ORed to produce the output; for this purpose, P_MD5 will generally have to be iterated more times than P_SHA to produce an equal amount of data for input to the exclusive-OR function.

Alert Codes

TLS supports all of the alert codes defined in SSLv3 with the exception of no_certificate. A number of additional codes are defined in TLS; of these, the following are always fatal:

  • decryption_failed: A ciphertext decrypted in an invalid way; either it was not an even multiple of the block length or its padding values, when checked, were incorrect.

  • record_overflow: A TLS record was received with a payload (ciphertext) whose length exceeds 214 + 2048 bytes, or the ciphertext decrypted to a length of greater than 214 1 1024 bytes.

  • unknown_ca: A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or could not be matched with a known, trusted CA.

  • access_denied: A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with the negotiation.

  • decode_error: A message could not be decoded because a field was out of its specified range or the length of the message was incorrect.

  • export_restriction: A negotiation not in compliance with export restrictions on key length was detected.

  • protocol_version: The protocol version the client attempted to negotiate is recognized but not supported.

  • insufficient_security: Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client.

  • internal_error: An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol makes it impossible to continue.

The remainder of the new alerts are the following:

  • decrypt_error: A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange, or validate a finished message.

  • user_canceled: This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure.

  • no_renegotiation: Sent by a client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking. Either of these messages would normally result in renegotiation, but this alert indicates that the sender is not able to renegotiate. This message is always a warning.

Cipher Suites

There are several small differences between the cipher suites available under SSLv3 and under TLS:

  • Key Exchange: TLS supports all of the key exchange techniques of SSLv3 with the exception of Fortezza.

  • Symmetric Encryption Algorithms: TLS includes all of the symmetric encryption algorithms found in SSLv3, with the exception of Fortezza.

Client Certificate Types

TLS defines the following certificate types to be requested in a certificate_ request message: rsa_sign, dss_sign, rsa_fixed_dh, and dss_fixed_dh. These are all defined in SSLv3. In addition, SSLv3 includes rsa_ephemeral_dh, dss_ephemeral_ dh, and fortezza_kea. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman involves signing the Diffie-Hellman parameters with either RSA or DSS; for TLS, the rsa_sign and dss_sign types are used for that function; a separate signing type is not needed to sign Diffie-Hellman parameters. TLS does not include the Fortezza scheme.

Certificate_Verify and Finished Messages

In the TLS certificate_verify message, the MD5 and SHA-1 hashes are calculated only over handshake_messages. Recall that for SSLv3, the hash calculation also included the master secret and pads. These extra fields were felt to add no additional security.

As with the finished message in SSLv3, the finished message in TLS is a hash based on the shared master_secret, the previous handshake messages, and a label that identifies client or server. The calculation is somewhat different. For TLS, we have

     PRF(master_secret, finished_label, MD5(handshake_messages) || SHA-
                               1(handshake_messages))

where finished_label is the string "client finished" for the client and "server finished" for the server.

Cryptographic Computations

The pre_master_secret for TLS is calculated in the same way as in SSLv3. As in SSLv3, the master_secret in TLS is calculated as a hash function of the pre_master_secret and the two hello random numbers. The form of the TLS calculation is different from that of SSLv3 and is defined as follows:

master_secret =
     PRF(pre_master_secret, "master secret", ClientHello.random || ServerHello.random)

The algorithm is performed until 48 bytes of pseudorandom output are produced. The calculation of the key block material (MAC secret keys, session encryption keys, and IVs) is defined as follows:

key_block =
          PRF(master_secret, "key expansion",
               SecurityParameters.server_random  || SecurityParameters.client_random)

until enough output has been generated. As with SSLv3, the key_block is a function of the master_secret and the client and server random numbers, but for TLS the actual algorithm is different.

Padding

In SSL, the padding added prior to encryption of user data is the minimum amount required so that the total size of the data to be encrypted is a multiple of the cipher's block length. In TLS, the padding can be any amount that results in a total that is a multiple of the cipher's block length, up to a maximum of 255 bytes. For example, if the plaintext (or compressed text if compression is used) plus MAC plus padding.length byte is 79 bytes long, then the padding length, in bytes, can be 1, 9, 17, and so on, up to 249. A variable padding length may be used to frustrate attacks based on an analysis of the lengths of exchanged messages.

14.3 Secure Electronic Transaction

SET is an open encryption and security specification designed to protect credit card transactions on the Internet. The current version, SETv1, emerged from a call for security standards by MasterCard and Visa in February 1996. A wide range of companies were involved in developing the initial specification, including IBM, Microsoft, Netscape, RSA, Terisa, and VeriSign. Beginning in 1996, there have been numerous tests of the concept, and by 1998 the first wave of SET-compliant products was available.

SET is not itself a payment system. Rather it is a set of security protocols and formats that enables users to employ the existing credit card payment infrastructure on an open network, such as the Internet, in a secure fashion. In essence, SET provides three services:

  • Provides a secure communications channel among all parties involved in a transaction

  • Provides trust by the use of X.509v3 digital certificates

  • Ensures privacy because the information is only available to parties in a transaction when and where necessary

SET is a complex specification defined in three books issued in May of 1997:

  • Book 1: Business Description (80 pages)

  • Book 2: Programmer's Guide (629 pages)

  • Book 3: Formal Protocol Definition (262 pages)

This is a total of 971 pages of specification. In contrast, the SSLv3 specification is 63 pages long and the TLS specification is 71 pages long. Accordingly, only a summary of this many-faceted specification is provided in this section.

SET Overview

A good way to begin our discussion of SET is to look at the business requirements for SET, its key features, and the participants in SET transactions.

Requirements

Book 1 of the SET specification lists the following business requirements for secure payment processing with credit cards over the Internet and other networks:

  • Provide confidentiality of payment and ordering information: It is necessary to assure cardholders that this information is safe and accessible only to the intended recipient. Confidentiality also reduces the risk of fraud by either party to the transaction or by malicious third parties. SET uses encryption to provide confidentiality.

  • Ensure the integrity of all transmitted data: That is, ensure that no changes in content occur during transmission of SET messages. Digital signatures are used to provide integrity.

  • Provide authentication that a cardholder is a legitimate user of a credit card account: A mechanism that links a cardholder to a specific account number reduces the incidence of fraud and the overall cost of payment processing. Digital signatures and certificates are used to verify that a cardholder is a legitimate user of a valid account.

  • Provide authentication that a merchant can accept credit card transactions through its relationship with a financial institution: This is the complement to the preceding requirement. Cardholders need to be able to identify merchants with whom they can conduct secure transactions. Again, digital signatures and certificates are used.

  • Ensure the use of the best security practices and system design techniques to protect all legitimate parties in an electronic commerce transaction: SET is a well-tested specification based on highly secure cryptographic algorithms and protocols.

  • Create a protocol that neither depends on transport security mechanisms nor prevents their use: SET can securely operate over a "raw" TCP/IP stack. However, SET does not interfere with the use of other security mechanisms, such as IPSec and SSL/TLS.

  • Facilitate and encourage interoperability among software and network providers: The SET protocols and formats are independent of hardware platform, operating system, and Web software.

Key Features of SET

To meet the requirements just outlined, SET incorporates the following features:

  • Confidentiality of information: Cardholder account and payment information is secured as it travels across the network. An interesting and important feature of SET is that it prevents the merchant from learning the cardholder's credit card number; this is only provided to the issuing bank. Conventional encryption by DES is used to provide confidentiality.

  • Integrity of data: Payment information sent from cardholders to merchants includes order information, personal data, and payment instructions. SET guarantees that these message contents are not altered in transit. RSA digital signatures, using SHA-1 hash codes, provide message integrity. Certain messages are also protected by HMAC using SHA-1.

  • Cardholder account authentication: SET enables merchants to verify that a cardholder is a legitimate user of a valid card account number. SET uses X.509v3 digital certificates with RSA signatures for this purpose.

  • Merchant authentication: SET enables cardholders to verify that a merchant has a relationship with a financial institution allowing it to accept payment cards. SET uses X.509v3 digital certificates with RSA signatures for this purpose.

Note that unlike IPSec and SSL/TLS, SET provides only one choice for each cryptographic algorithm. This makes sense, because SET is a single application with a single set of requirements, whereas IPSec and SSL/TLS are intended to support a range of applications.

SET Participants

Cc767139.f14-8(en-us,TechNet.10).gif

Figure 14: indicates the participants in the SET system, which include the following:
  • Cardholder: In the electronic environment, consumers and corporate purchasers interact with merchants from personal computers over the Internet. A cardholder is an authorized holder of a payment card (e.g., MasterCard, Visa) that has been issued by an issuer.

  • Merchant: A merchant is a person or organization that has goods or services to sell to the cardholder. Typically, these goods and services are offered via a Web site or by electronic mail. A merchant that accepts payment cards must have a relationship with an acquirer.

  • Issuer: This is a financial institution, such as a bank, that provides the cardholder with the payment card. Typically, accounts are applied for and opened by mail or in person. Ultimately, it is the issuer that is responsible for the payment of the debt of the cardholder.

  • Acquirer: This is a financial institution that establishes an account with a merchant and processes payment card authorizations and payments. Merchants will usually accept more than one credit card brand but do not want to deal with multiple bankcard associations or with multiple individual issuers. The acquirer provides authorization to the merchant that a given card account is active and that the proposed purchase does not exceed the credit limit. The acquirer also provides electronic transfer of payments to the merchant's account. Subsequently, the acquirer is reimbursed by the issuer over some sort of payment network for electronic funds transfer.

  • Payment Gateway: This is a function operated by the acquirer or a designated third party that processes merchant payment messages. The payment gateway interfaces between SET and the existing bankcard payment networks for authorization and payment functions. The merchant exchanges SET messages with the payment gateway over the Internet, while the payment gateway has some direct or network connection to the acquirer's financial processing system.

  • Certification Authority (CA): This is an entity that is trusted to issue X.509v3 public-key certificates for cardholders, merchants, and payment gateways. The success of SET will depend on the existence of a CA infrastructure available for this purpose. As was discussed in previous chapters, a hierarchy of CAs is used, so that participants need not be directly certified by a root authority.

We now briefly describe the sequence of events that are required for a transaction. We will then look at some of the cryptographic details.

  1. The customer opens an account. The customer obtains a credit card account, such as MasterCard or Visa, with a bank that supports electronic payment and SET.

  2. The customer receives a certificate. After suitable verification of identity, the customer receives an X.509v3 digital certificate, which is signed by the bank. The certificate verifies the customer's RSA public key and its expiration date. It also establishes a relationship, guaranteed by the bank, between the customer's key pair and his or her credit card.

  3. Merchants have their own certificates. A merchant who accepts a certain brand of card must be in possession of two certificates for two public keys owned by the merchant: one for signing messages, and one for key exchange. The merchant also needs a copy of the payment gateway's public-key certificate.

  4. The customer places an order. This is a process that may involve the customer first browsing through the merchant's Web site to select items and determine the price. The customer then sends a list of the items to be purchased to the merchant, who returns an order form containing the list of items, their price, a total price, and an order number.

  5. The merchant is verified. In addition to the order form, the merchant sends a copy of its certificate, so that the customer can verify that he or she is dealing with a valid store.

  6. The order and payment are sent. The customer sends both order and payment information to the merchant, along with the customer's certificate. The order confirms the purchase of the items in the order form. The payment contains credit card details. The payment information is encrypted in such a way that it cannot be read by the merchant. The customer's certificate enables the merchant to verify the customer.

  7. The merchant requests payment authorization. The merchant sends the payment information to the payment gateway, requesting authorization that the customer's available credit is sufficient for this purchase.

  8. The merchant confirms the order. The merchant sends confirmation of the order to the customer.

  9. The merchant provides the goods or service. The merchant ships the goods or provides the service to the customer.

  10. The merchant requests payment. This request is sent to the payment gateway, which handles all of the payment processing.

Dual Signature

Before looking at the details of the SET protocol, let us discuss an important innovation introduced in SET: the dual signature. The purpose of the dual signature is to link two messages that are intended for two different recipients. In this case, the customer want to send the order information (OI) to the merchant and the payment information (PI) to the bank. The merchant does not need to know the customer's credit card number, and the bank does not need to know the details of the customer's order. The customer is afforded extra protection in terms of privacy by keeping these two items separate. However, the two items must be linked in a way that can be used to resolve disputes if necessary. The link is needed so that the customer can prove that this payment is intended for this order and not for some other goods or service.

To see the need for the link, suppose that the customer sends the merchant two messages—a signed OI and a signed PI—and the merchant passes the PI on to the bank. If the merchant can capture another OI from this customer, the merchant could claim that this OI goes with the PI rather than the original OI. The linkage prevents this.

Cc767139.f14-9(en-us,TechNet.10).gif

Figure 14: shows the use of a dual signature to meet the requirement of the preceding paragraph. The customer takes the hash (using SHA-1) of the PI and the hash of the OI. These two hashes are then concatenated and the hash of the result is taken. Finally, the customer encrypts the final hash with his or her private signature key, creating the dual signature. The operation can be summarized as follows:
     DS = EKRc[H(H(PI)||H(OI))]

where KRc is the customer's private signature key. Now suppose that the merchant is in possession of the dual signature (DS), the OI, and the message digest for the PI (PIMD). The merchant also has the public key of the customer, taken from the customer's certificate. Then the merchant can compute the following two quantities:

     H(PIMD||H(OI)) and DKUc[DS]

where KUc is the customer's public signature key. If these two quantities are equal, then the merchant has verified the signature. Similarly, if the bank is in possession of DS, PI, the message digest for OI (OIMD), and the customer's public key, then the bank can compute the following:

     H(H(PI)||OIMD) and DKUc[DS]

Again, if these two quantities are equal, then the bank has verified the signature. In summary,

  1. The merchant has received OI and verified the signature.

  2. The bank has received PI and verified the signature.

  3. The customer has linked the OI and PI and can prove the linkage.

For example, suppose the merchant wishes to substitute another OI in this transaction, to its advantage. It would then have to find another OI whose hash matches the existing OIMD. With SHA-1, this is deemed not to be feasible. Thus, the merchant cannot link another OI with this PI.

Table 14.3 SET Transaction Types

Cardholder registration

Cardholders must register with a CA before they can send SET messages to merchants.

Merchant registration

Merchants must register with a CA before they can exchange SET messages with customers and payment gateways.

Purchase request

Message from customer to merchant containing OI for merchant and PI for bank.

Payment authorization

Exchange between merchant and payment gateway to authorize a given amount for a purchase on a given credit card account.

Payment capture

Allows the merchant to request payment from the payment gateway.

Certificate inquiry and status

If the CA is unable to complete the processing of a certificate request quickly, it will send a reply to the cardholder or merchant indicating that the requester should check back later. The cardholder or merchant sends the Certificate Inquiry message to determine the status of the certificate request and to receive the certificate if the request has been approved.

Purchase inquiry

Allows the cardholder to check the status of the processing of an order after the purchase response has been received. Note that this message does not include information such as the status of back-ordered goods but does indicate the status of authorization, capture, and credit processing.

Authorization reversal

Allows a merchant to correct previous authorization requests. If the order will not be completed, the merchant reverses the entire authorization. If part of the order will not be completed (such as when goods are back ordered), the merchant reverses part of the amount of the authorization.

Capture reversal

Allows a merchant to correct errors in capture requests such as transaction amounts that were entered incorrectly by a clerk.

Credit

Allows a merchant to issue a credit to a cardholder's account such as when goods are returned or were damaged during shipping. Note that the SET Credit message is always initiated by the merchant, not the cardholder. All communications between the cardholder and merchant that result in a credit being processed happen outside of SET.

Credit reversal

Allows a merchant to correct a previously request credit.

Payment gateway certificate

Allows a merchant to query the payment gateway and receive a copy of

request

the gateway's current key exchange and signature certificates.

Batch administration

Allows a merchant to communicate information to the payment gateway regarding merchant batches.

Error message

Indicates that a responder rejects a message because it fails format or content verification tests.

Payment Processing

Table 14.3 lists the transaction types supported by SET. In what follows we look in some detail at the following transactions:

  • Purchase request

  • Payment authorization

  • Payment capture

Purchase Request

Before the Purchase Request exchange begins, the cardholder has completed browsing, selecting, and ordering. The end of this preliminary phase occurs when the merchant sends a completed order form to the customer. All of the preceding occurs without the use of SET.

The purchase request exchange consists of four messages: Initiate Request, Initiate Response, Purchase Request, and Purchase Response.

In order to send SET messages to the merchant, the cardholder must have a copy of the certificates of the merchant and the payment gateway. The customer requests the certificates in the Initiate Request message, sent to the merchant. This message includes the brand of the credit card that the customer is using. The message also includes an ID assigned to this request/response pair by the customer and a nonce used to ensure timeliness.

The merchant generates a response and signs it with its private signature key. The response includes the nonce from the customer, another nonce for the customer to return in the next message, and a transaction ID for this purchase transaction. In addition to the signed response, the Initiate Response message includes the merchant's signature certificate and the payment gateway's key exchange certificate.

Cc767139.f14-10(en-us,TechNet.10).gif

The cardholder verifies the merchant and gateway certificates by means of their respective CA signatures and then creates the OI and PI. The transaction ID assigned by the merchant is placed in both the OI and PI. The OI does not contain explicit order data such as the number and price of items. Rather, it contains an order reference generated in the exchange between merchant and customer during the shopping phase before the first SET message. Next, the cardholder prepares the Purchase Request message (Figure 14.10). For this purpose, the cardholder generates a one-time symmetric encryption key, Ks. The message includes the following:

  1. Purchase-related information. This information will be forwarded to the payment gateway by the merchant and consists of

    • The PI

    • The dual signature, calculated over the PI and OI, signed with the customer's private signature key

    • The OI message digest (OIMD)

      The OIMD is needed for the payment gateway to verify the dual signature, as explained previously. All of these items are encrypted with Ks. The final item is

    • The digital envelope. This is formed by encrypting Ks with the payment gateway's public key-exchange key. It is called a digital envelope because this envelope must be opened (decrypted) before the other items listed previously can be read.

  2. The value of Ks is not made available to the merchant. Therefore, the merchant cannot read any of this payment-related information.

  3. Order-related information. This information is needed by the merchant and consists of

    • The OI

    • The dual signature, calculated over the PI and OI, signed with the customer's private signature key

    • The PI message digest (PIMD)

  4. The PIMD is needed for the merchant to verify the dual signature. Note that the OI is sent in the clear.

  5. Cardholder certificate. This contains the cardholder's public signature key. It is needed by the merchant and by the payment gateway.

When the merchant receives the Purchase Request message, it performs the following actions (Figure 14.11):

Cc767139.f14-11(en-us,TechNet.10).gif

  1. Verifies the cardholder certificates by means of its CA signatures.

  2. Verifies the dual signature using the customer's public signature key. This ensures that the order has not been tampered with in transit and that it was signed using the cardholder's private signature key.

  3. Processes the order and forwards the payment information to the payment gateway for authorization (described later).

  4. Sends a purchase response to the cardholder.

The Purchase Response message includes a response block that acknowledges the order and references the corresponding transaction number. This block is signed by the merchant using its private signature key. The block and its signature are sent to the customer, along with the merchant's signature certificate.

When the cardholder software receives the purchase response message, it verifies the merchant's certificate and then verifies the signature on the response block. Finally, it takes some action based on the response, such as displaying a message to the user or updating a database with the status of the order.

Payment Authorization

During the processing of an order from a cardholder, the merchant authorizes the transaction with the payment gateway. The payment authorization ensures that the transaction was approved by the issuer. This authorization guarantees that the merchant will receive payment; the merchant can therefore provide the services or goods to the customer. The payment authorization exchange consists of two messages: Authorization Request and Authorization response.

The merchant sends an Authorization Request message to the payment gateway consisting of

  1. Purchase-related information. This information was obtained from the customer and consists of:

    • The PI

    • The dual signature, calculated over the PI and OI, signed with the customer's private signature key

    • The OI message digest (OIMD)

    • The digital envelope

  2. Authorization-related information. This information is generated by the merchant and consists of

    • An authorization block that includes the transaction ID, signed with the merchant's private signature key and encrypted with a one-time symmetric key generated by the merchant

    • A digital envelope. This is formed by encrypting the one-time key with the payment gateway's public key-exchange key.

  3. Certificates. The merchant includes the cardholder's signature key certificate (used to verify the dual signature), the merchant's signature key certificate (used to verify the merchant's signature), and the merchant's key-exchange certificate (needed in the payment gateway's response).

The payment gateway performs the following tasks:

  1. Verifies all certificates

  2. Decrypts the digital envelope of the authorization block to obtain the symmetric key and then decrypts the authorization block

  3. Verifies the merchant's signature on the authorization block

  4. Decrypts the digital envelope of the payment block to obtain the symmetric key and then decrypts the payment block

  5. Verifies the dual signature on the payment block

  6. Verifies that the transaction ID received from the merchant matches that in the PI received (indirectly) from the customer

  7. Requests and receives an authorization from the issuer

Having obtained authorization from the issuer, the payment gateway returns an Authorization Response message to the merchant. It includes the following elements:

  1. Authorization-related information. Includes an authorization block, signed with the gateway's private signature key and encrypted with a one-time symmetric key generated by the gateway. Also includes a digital envelope that contains the one-time key encrypted with the merchants public key-exchange key.

  2. Capture token information. This information will be used to effect payment later. This block is of the same form as (1)—namely, a signed, encrypted capture token together with a digital envelope. This token is not processed by the merchant. Rather, it must be returned, as is, with a payment request.

  3. Certificate. The gateway's signature key certificate.

With the authorization from the gateway, the merchant can provide the goods or service to the customer.

Payment Capture

To obtain payment, the merchant engages the payment gateway in a payment capture transaction, consisting of a capture request and a capture response message.

For the Capture Request message, the merchant generates, signs, and encrypts a capture request block, which includes the payment amount and the transaction ID. The message also includes the encrypted capture token received earlier (in the Authorization Response) for this transaction, as well as the merchant's signature key and key-exchange key certificates.

When the payment gateway receives the capture request message, it decrypts and verifies the capture request block and decrypts and verifies the capture token block. It then checks for consistency between the capture request and capture token. It then creates a clearing request that is sent to the issuer over the private payment network. This request causes funds to be transferred to the merchant's account.

The gateway then notifies the merchant of payment in a Capture Response message. The message includes a capture response block that the gateway signs and encrypts. The message also includes the gateway's signature key certificate. The merchant software stores the capture response to be used for reconciliation with payment received from the acquirer.

14.4 Recommended Reading

Two good treatments of web security are [RUBI97] and [GARF97]; the latter is somewhat more technical. The best detailed overview of SET is in Book 1 of the specification, available at the MasterCard and VISA SET Web sites. Another excellent overview is [MACG97].

GARF97

Garfinkel, S., and Spafford, G. Web Security & Commerce. Cambridge, MA: O'Reilly and Associates, 1997.

MACG97

Macgregor, R.; Ezvan, C.; Liguori, L.; and Han, J. Secure Electronic Transactions: Credit Card Payment on the Web in Theory and Practice. IBM RedBook SG24-4978-00, 1997. Available at http://publib-b.boulder.ibm.com/Redbooks.nsf/9445fa5b416f6e32852569ae006bb65f/bedceb456df710ba8525659d002a5842?OpenDocument.

RUBI97

Rubin, A.; Geer, D.; and Ranum, M. Web Security Sourcebook. New York: Wiley, 1997.

14.5 Problems

14.1 In SSL and TLS, why is there a separate Change Cipher Spec Protocol, rather than including a change_cipher_spec message in the Handshake Protocol?

14.2 Consider the following threats to Web security and describe how each is countered by a particular feature of SSL.

  1. Brute-Force Cryptanalytic Attack: An exhaustive search of the key space for a conventional encryption algorithm.

  2. Known-Plaintext Dictionary Attack: Many messages will contain predictable plaintext, such as the HTTP GET command. An attacker constructs a dictionary containing every possible encryption of the known-plaintext message. When an encrypted message is intercepted, the attacker takes the portion containing the encrypted known plaintext and looks up the ciphertext in the dictionary. The ciphertext should match against an entry that was encrypted with the same secret key. If there are several matches, each of these can be tried against the full ciphertext to determine the right one. This attack is especially effective against small key sizes (e.g., 40-bit keys).

  3. Replay Attack: Earlier SSL handshake messages are replayed.

  4. Man-in-the-Middle Attack: An attacker interposes during key exchange, acting as the client to the server and as the server to the client.

  5. Password Sniffing: Passwords in HTTP or other application traffic are eavesdropped.

  6. IP Spoofing: Uses forged IP addresses to fool a host into accepting bogus data.

  7. IP Hijacking: An active, authenticated connection between two hosts is disrupted and the attacker takes the place of one of the hosts.

  8. SYN Flooding: An attacker sends TCP SYN messages to request a connection but does not respond to the final message to establish the connection fully. The attacked TCP module typically leaves the "half-open connection" around for a few minutes. Repeated SYN messages can clog the TCP module.

14.3 Based on what you have learned in this chapter, is it possible in SSL for the receiver to reorder SSL record blocks that arrive out of order? If so, explain how it can be done. If not, why not?

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