Microsoft Security Bulletin MS09-017 - Critical

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• Microsoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3 blocks the opening and saving of certain files by default upon installation. For Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2003 Service Pack 3, these are files that are older than PowerPoint 97 and that have file types such as .ppt, .pot, .pps, and .ppa. Notice that this feature does not apply to Microsoft Office PowerPoint 97 files. For more information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 938810.
• Users who have installed and are using the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool for Office 2000 will be prompted with Open, Save, or Cancel before opening a document. The features of the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool are incorporated in Office XP and later editions of Office.
• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
• This vulnerability does not affect PowerPoint 2007, PowerPoint Viewer 2003, and PowerPoint Viewer 2007.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Restrict access to pp4x322.dll in Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 or Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002

  Note You will need administrator privileges to set these file restrictions.

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  Impact of Workaround. You will not be able to open PowerPoint 4.0 files.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
When PowerPoint reads paragraph formatting data from specially crafted PowerPoint 4.0 files, an error may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the current logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint 4.0 file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint.

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update prevents Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 and Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002 from opening PowerPoint 4.0 native file formats.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• Microsoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3 blocks the opening and saving of certain files by default upon installation. For Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2003 Service Pack 3, these are files that are older than PowerPoint 97 and that have file types such as .ppt, .pot, .pps, and .ppa. Notice that this feature does not apply to Microsoft Office PowerPoint 97 files. For more information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 938810.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.
• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Use the Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) when opening files from unknown or untrusted sources

  The Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) will protect Office 2003 installations by more securely opening Word, Excel, and PowerPoint binary format files.

  To install MOICE, you must have Office 2003 or 2007 Office system installed.

  To install MOICE, you must have the Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 2007 File Formats. The compatibility pack is available as a free download from the Microsoft Download Center:

  Download the FileFormatConverters.exe package now

  MOICE requires all updates that are recommended for all Office programs. Visit Microsoft Update to install all recommended updates:

  http://update.microsoft.com/microsoftupdate/v6/default.aspx?ln=en-us

  To enable MOICE, change the registered handler for the .ppt, .pot, and .pps file formats. The following table describes the command to enable or to disable MOICE for the .ppt, .pot, and .pps file formats:

Note On Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, the commands above will need to be run from an elevated command prompt.

For more information on MOICE, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 935865.

Impact of Workaround: Office 2003 and earlier formatted documents that are converted to the 2007 Microsoft Office System Open XML format by MOICE will not retain macro functionality. Additionally, documents with passwords or that are protected with Digital Rights Management cannot be converted.

• Use Microsoft Office File Block policy to block the opening of Office 2003 and earlier documents from unknown or untrusted sources and locations

  The following registry scripts can be used to set the File Block policy.

  Note Modifying the Registry incorrectly can cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that problems resulting from incorrect modification of the Registry can be solved. Modify the Registry at your own risk.

  • For Office 2003

    Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

    [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]

    "BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001

    Note In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Office 2003, all of the latest Office 2003 security updates must be applied.

  Impact of Workaround: Users who have configured the File Block policy and have not configured a special “exempt directory” as discussed in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 970980 will be unable to open Office 2003 files or earlier versions in Office 2003 or 2007 Microsoft Office System.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • For Office 2003

    Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

    [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]

    "BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000

• Do not open or save Microsoft Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
When PowerPoint reads an invalid record type in a specially crafted PowerPoint file, an error may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the current logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint.

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
The update modifies the way that PowerPoint validates record types when opening PowerPoint files.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• Microsoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3 blocks the opening and saving of certain files by default upon installation. For Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2003 Service Pack 3, these are files that are older than PowerPoint 97 and that have file types such as .ppt, .pot, .pps, and .ppa. Notice that this feature does not apply to Microsoft Office PowerPoint 97 files. For more information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 938810.
• Users who have installed and are using the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool for Office 2000 will be prompted with Open, Save, or Cancel before opening a document. The features of the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool are incorporated in Office XP and later editions of Office.
• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
• This vulnerability does not affect PowerPoint 2007, PowerPoint Viewer 2003, and PowerPoint Viewer 2007.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Restrict access to pp4x322.dll in Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 or Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002

  Note You will need administrator privileges to set these file restrictions.

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  Impact of Workaround. You will not be able to open PowerPoint 4.0 files.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
When PowerPoint reads sound data from specially crafted PowerPoint 4.0 files, an error may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the current logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint 4.0 file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint.

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update prevents Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 and Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002 from opening PowerPoint 4.0 native file formats.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• Microsoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3 blocks the opening and saving of certain files by default upon installation. For Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2003 Service Pack 3, these are files that are older than PowerPoint 97 and that have file types such as .ppt, .pot, .pps, and .ppa. Notice that this feature does not apply to Microsoft Office PowerPoint 97 files. For more information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 938810.
• Users who have installed and are using the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool for Office 2000 will be prompted with Open, Save, or Cancel before opening a document. The features of the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool are incorporated in Office XP and later editions of Office.
• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
• This vulnerability does not affect PowerPoint 2007, PowerPoint Viewer 2003, and PowerPoint Viewer 2007.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Restrict access to pp4x322.dll in Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 or Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002

  Note You will need administrator privileges to set these file restrictions.

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  Impact of Workaround. You will not be able to open PowerPoint 4.0 files.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
When PowerPoint reads sound data from specially crafted PowerPoint 4.0 files, an error may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the current logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint 4.0 file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint.

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update prevents Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 and Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002 from opening PowerPoint 4.0 native file formats.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• Users who have installed and are using the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool for Office 2000 will be prompted with Open, Save, or Cancel before opening a document. The features of the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool are incorporated in Office XP and later editions of Office.
• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful, a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Use the Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) when opening files from unknown or untrusted sources

  The Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) will protect Office 2003 installations by more securely opening Word, Excel, and PowerPoint binary format files.

  To install MOICE, you must have Office 2003 or 2007 Office system installed.

  To install MOICE, you must have the Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 2007 File Formats. The compatibility pack is available as a free download from the Microsoft Download Center:

  Download the FileFormatConverters.exe package now

  MOICE requires all updates that are recommended for all Office programs. Visit Microsoft Update to install all recommended updates:

  http://update.microsoft.com/microsoftupdate/v6/default.aspx?ln=en-us

  To enable MOICE, change the registered handler for the .ppt, .pot, and .pps file formats. The following table describes the command to enable or to disable MOICE for the .ppt, .pot, and .pps file formats:

Note On Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, the commands above will need to be run from an elevated command prompt.

For more information on MOICE, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 935865.

Impact of Workaround: Office 2003 and earlier formatted documents that are converted to the 2007 Microsoft Office System Open XML format by MOICE will not retain macro functionality. Additionally, documents with passwords or that are protected with Digital Rights Management cannot be converted.

• Use Microsoft Office File Block policy to block the opening of Office 2003 and earlier documents from unknown or untrusted sources and locations

  The following registry scripts can be used to set the File Block policy.

  Note Modifying the Registry incorrectly can cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that problems resulting from incorrect modification of the Registry can be solved. Modify the Registry at your own risk.

  • For Office 2003

    Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

    [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]

    "BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001

    Note In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Office 2003, all of the latest Office 2003 security updates must be applied.

  Impact of Workaround: Users who have configured the File Block policy and have not configured a special “exempt directory” as discussed in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 970980 will be unable to open Office 2003 files or earlier versions in Office 2003 or 2007 Microsoft Office System.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • For Office 2003

    Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

    [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]

    "BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000

• Do not open or save Microsoft Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
When PowerPoint reads an invalid record type in a specially crafted PowerPoint file, an error may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the current logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint.

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
The update modifies the way that PowerPoint validates list records when opening PowerPoint files.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
• This vulnerability does not affect PowerPoint 2000, PowerPoint 2003, PowerPoint 2007, PowerPoint Viewer 2003, and PowerPoint Viewer 2007.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Restrict access to pp7x32.dll in Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002

  Note You will need administrator privileges to set these file restrictions.

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  Impact of Workaround. You will not be able to open PowerPoint 95 files.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
When PowerPoint reads sound data from specially crafted PowerPoint 95 files, an error may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the current logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint 95 file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint.

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update modifies the way that Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002 opens PowerPoint 95 native file formats.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• Microsoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3 blocks the opening and saving of certain files by default upon installation. For Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2003 Service Pack 3, these are files that are older than PowerPoint 97 and that have file types such as .ppt, .pot, .pps, and .ppa. Notice that this feature does not apply to Microsoft Office PowerPoint 97 files. For more information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 938810.
• Users who have installed and are using the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool for Office 2000 will be prompted with Open, Save, or Cancel before opening a document. The features of the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool are incorporated in Office XP and later editions of Office.
• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
• This vulnerability does not affect PowerPoint 2007, PowerPoint Viewer 2003, and PowerPoint Viewer 2007.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Restrict access to pp4x322.dll in Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 or Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002

  Note You will need administrator privileges to set these file restrictions.

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  Impact of Workaround. You will not be able to open PowerPoint 4.0 files.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
When PowerPoint reads sound data from specially crafted PowerPoint 4.0 files, an error may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the current logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint 4.0 file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint.

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update prevents Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 and Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002 from opening PowerPoint 4.0 native file formats.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• Microsoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3 blocks the opening and saving of certain files by default upon installation. For Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2003 Service Pack 3, these are files that are older than PowerPoint 97 and that have file types such as .ppt, .pot, .pps, and .ppa. Notice that this feature does not apply to Microsoft Office PowerPoint 97 files. For more information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 938810.
• Users who have installed and are using the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool for Office 2000 will be prompted with Open, Save, or Cancel before opening a document. The features of the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool are incorporated in Office XP and later editions of Office.
• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
• This vulnerability does not affect PowerPoint 2007, PowerPoint Viewer 2003, and PowerPoint Viewer 2007.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Restrict access to pp4x322.dll in Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 or Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002

  Note You will need administrator privileges to set these file restrictions.

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  Impact of Workaround. You will not be able to open PowerPoint 4.0 files.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
When PowerPoint reads sound data from specially crafted PowerPoint 4.0 files, an error may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the current logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint 4.0 file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint.

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update prevents Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 and Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002 from opening PowerPoint 4.0 native file formats.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• Users who have installed and are using the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool for Office 2000 will be prompted with Open, Save, or Cancel before opening a document. The features of the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool are incorporated in Office XP and later editions of Office.
• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful, a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Use the Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) when opening files from unknown or untrusted sources

  The Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) will protect Office 2003 installations by more securely opening Word, Excel, and PowerPoint binary format files.

  To install MOICE, you must have Office 2003 or 2007 Office system installed.

  To install MOICE, you must have the Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 2007 File Formats. The compatibility pack is available as a free download from the Microsoft Download Center:

  Download the FileFormatConverters.exe package now

  MOICE requires all updates that are recommended for all Office programs. Visit Microsoft Update to install all recommended updates:

  http://update.microsoft.com/microsoftupdate/v6/default.aspx?ln=en-us

  To enable MOICE, change the registered handler for the .ppt, .pot, and .pps file formats. The following table describes the command to enable or to disable MOICE for the .ppt, .pot, and .pps file formats:

Note On Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, the commands above will need to be run from an elevated command prompt.

For more information on MOICE, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 935865.

Impact of Workaround: Office 2003 and earlier formatted documents that are converted to the 2007 Microsoft Office System Open XML format by MOICE will not retain macro functionality. Additionally, documents with passwords or that are protected with Digital Rights Management cannot be converted.

• Use Microsoft Office File Block policy to block the opening of Office 2003 and earlier documents from unknown or untrusted sources and locations

  The following registry scripts can be used to set the File Block policy.

  Note Modifying the Registry incorrectly can cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that problems resulting from incorrect modification of the Registry can be solved. Modify the Registry at your own risk.

  • For Office 2003

    Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

    [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]

    "BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001

    Note In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Office 2003, all of the latest Office 2003 security updates must be applied.

  Impact of Workaround: Users who have configured the File Block policy and have not configured a special “exempt directory” as discussed in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 970980 will be unable to open Office 2003 files or earlier versions in Office 2003 or 2007 Microsoft Office System.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • For Office 2003

    Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

    [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]

    "BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000

• Do not open or save Microsoft Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
The vulnerability is caused by memory corruption when PowerPoint reads an invalid index value in a specially crafted PowerPoint file. The resulting error may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the logged-in user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint.

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
The update removes the vulnerability by modifying the way that PowerPoint validates memory allocations when opening PowerPoint files.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
Yes. This vulnerability has been publicly disclosed. It has been assigned Common Vulnerability and Exposure number CVE-2009-0556. This vulnerability was first described in Microsoft Security Advisory 969136.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
Yes. Microsoft is aware of limited, targeted attacks attempting to exploit the vulnerability.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• Microsoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3 blocks the opening and saving of certain files by default upon installation. For Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2003 Service Pack 3, these are files that are older than PowerPoint 97 and that have file types such as .ppt, .pot, .pps, and .ppa. Notice that this feature does not apply to Microsoft Office PowerPoint 97 files. For more information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 938810.
• Users who have installed and are using the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool for Office 2000 will be prompted with Open, Save, or Cancel before opening a document. The features of the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool are incorporated in Office XP and later editions of Office.
• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
• This vulnerability does not affect PowerPoint 2007, PowerPoint Viewer 2003, and PowerPoint Viewer 2007.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Restrict access to pp7x32.dll in Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 or Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002

  Note You will need administrator privileges to set these file restrictions.

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  Impact of Workaround. You will not be able to open PowerPoint 95 files.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability causes memory corruption when reading sound data from specially crafted older PowerPoint 95 formatted files.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint.

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update modifies the way that Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000, Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002, and Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2003 open PowerPoint 95 native file formats.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• Microsoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3 blocks the opening and saving of certain files by default upon installation. For Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2003 Service Pack 3, these are files that are older than PowerPoint 97 and that have file types such as .ppt, .pot, .pps, and .ppa. Notice that this feature does not apply to Microsoft Office PowerPoint 97 files. For more information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 938810.
• Users who have installed and are using the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool for Office 2000 will be prompted with Open, Save, or Cancel before opening a document. The features of the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool are incorporated in Office XP and later editions of Office.
• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
• This vulnerability does not affect PowerPoint 2007, PowerPoint Viewer 2003, and PowerPoint Viewer 2007.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Restrict access to pp7x32.dll in Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 or Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002

  Note You will need administrator privileges to set these file restrictions.

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  Impact of Workaround. You will not be able to open PowerPoint 95 files.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp7x32.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability causes memory corruption when reading sound data from specially crafted older PowerPoint 95 formatted files.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update modifies the way that Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000, Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002, and Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2003 open PowerPoint 95 native file formats.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful, a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Use the Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) when opening files from unknown or untrusted sources

  The Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) will protect Office 2003 installations by more securely opening Word, Excel, and PowerPoint binary format files.

  To install MOICE, you must have Office 2003 or 2007 Office system installed.

  To install MOICE, you must have the Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 2007 File Formats. The compatibility pack is available as a free download from the Microsoft Download Center:

  Download the FileFormatConverters.exe package now

  MOICE requires all updates that are recommended for all Office programs. Visit Microsoft Update to install all recommended updates:

  http://update.microsoft.com/microsoftupdate/v6/default.aspx?ln=en-us

  To enable MOICE, change the registered handler for the .ppt, .pot, and .pps file formats. The following table describes the command to enable or to disable MOICE for the .ppt, .pot, and .pps file formats:

Note On Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, the commands above will need to be run from an elevated command prompt.

For more information on MOICE, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 935865.

Impact of Workaround: Office 2003 and earlier formatted documents that are converted to the 2007 Microsoft Office System Open XML format by MOICE will not retain macro functionality. Additionally, documents with passwords or that are protected with Digital Rights Management cannot be converted.

• Use Microsoft Office File Block policy to block the opening of Office 2003 and earlier documents from unknown or untrusted sources and locations

  The following registry scripts can be used to set the File Block policy.

  Note Modifying the Registry incorrectly can cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that problems resulting from incorrect modification of the Registry can be solved. Modify the Registry at your own risk.

  • For Office 2003

    Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

    [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]

    "BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001

    Note In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Office 2003, all of the latest Office 2003 security updates must be applied.

  Impact of Workaround: Users who have configured the File Block policy and have not configured a special “exempt directory” as discussed in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 970980 will be unable to open Office 2003 files or earlier versions in Office 2003 or 2007 Microsoft Office System.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • For Office 2003

    Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

    [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]

    "BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000

• Do not open or save Microsoft Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
The vulnerability is caused by memory corruption when PowerPoint reads a malformed structure value in a specially crafted PowerPoint file. The resulting error may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
The update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Microsoft Office PowerPoint validates the vulnerable memory structure when opening PowerPoint files.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• Users who have installed and are using the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool for Office 2000 will be prompted with Open, Save, or Cancel before opening a document. The features of the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool are incorporated in Office XP and later editions of Office.
• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful, a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Do not open or save Microsoft Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
When Microsoft Office PowerPoint reads data that is too large in a specially crafted PowerPoint file, an error may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the logged-on in user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
The update removes the vulnerability by modifying the way that Microsoft Office PowerPoint validates memory allocations when opening PowerPoint files.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

• Microsoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3 blocks the opening and saving of certain files by default upon installation. For Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2003 Service Pack 3, these are files that are older than PowerPoint 97 and that have file types such as .ppt, .pot, .pps, and .ppa. Notice that this feature does not apply to Microsoft Office PowerPoint 97 files. For more information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 938810.
• Users who have installed and are using the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool for Office 2000 will be prompted with Open, Save, or Cancel before opening a document. The features of the Office Document Open Confirmation Tool are incorporated in Office XP and later editions of Office.
• The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
• In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.
• An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
• This vulnerability does not affect PowerPoint 2007, PowerPoint Viewer 2003, and PowerPoint Viewer 2007.

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

• Restrict access to pp4x322.dll in Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 or Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002

  Note You will need administrator privileges to set these file restrictions.

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /P everyone:N

  Impact of Workaround. You will not be able to open PowerPoint 4.0 files.

  How to Undo the Workaround:

  • On 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, run the following command from a command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 32-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

  • On 64-bit editions of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    for /F "tokens=*" %G IN ('dir /b /s ^"%programfiles(x86)%\Microsoft Office\pp4x322.dll^"') DO cacls "%G" /E /R everyone

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
When PowerPoint reads sound data from specially crafted PowerPoint 4.0 files, an error may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system in the context of the current logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted PowerPoint 4.0 file with an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint.

In a Web-based attack scenario, a Web site could contain a PowerPoint file that is used to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site and open a specially crafted PowerPoint file, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, and then convincing them to open the specially crafted PowerPoint file.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted PowerPoint file to the user and convincing the user to open the file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where an affected version of Microsoft Office PowerPoint is used, such as workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update prevents Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 and Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2002 from opening PowerPoint 4.0 native file formats.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Reference Table

The following table contains the security update information for this software. You can find additional information in the subsection, Deployment Information, in this section.

Reference Table

The following table contains the security update information for this software. You can find additional information in the subsection, Deployment Information, in this section.

Reference Table

The following table contains the security update information for this software. You can find additional information in the subsection, Deployment Information, in this section.

Reference Table

The following table contains the security update information for this software. You can find additional information in the subsection, Deployment Information, in this section.

Reference Table

The following table contains the security update information for this software. You can find additional information in the subsection, Deployment Information, in this section.