Security Bulletin

Microsoft Security Bulletin MS10-103 - Important

Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Publisher Could Allow Remote Code Execution (2292970)

Published: December 14, 2010

Version: 1.0

General Information

Executive Summary

This security update resolves five privately reported vulnerabilities in Microsoft Publisher that could allow remote code execution if a user opens a specially crafted Publisher file. An attacker who successfully exploited any of these vulnerabilities could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

This security update is rated Important for supported editions of Microsoft Publisher 2002, Microsoft Publisher 2003, Microsoft Publisher 2007, and Microsoft Publisher 2010. For more information, see the subsection, Affected and Non-Affected Software, in this section.

The update addresses the vulnerabilities by correcting the way that Microsoft Publisher parses specially crafted Publisher files. For more information about the vulnerability, see the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) subsection for the specific vulnerability entry under the next section, Vulnerability Information.

Recommendation. Microsoft recommends that customers apply the update at the earliest opportunity.

Known Issues. Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 2292970 documents the currently known issues that customers may experience when installing this security update. The article also documents recommended solutions for these issues. When currently known issues and recommended solutions pertain only to specific releases of this software, this article provides links to further articles.

Affected and Non-Affected Software

The following software have been tested to determine which versions or editions are affected. Other versions or editions are either past their support life cycle or are not affected. To determine the support life cycle for your software version or edition, visit Microsoft Support Lifecycle.

Affected Software

Microsoft Office Suite and Other Software Component Maximum Security Impact Aggregate Severity Rating Bulletins Replaced by this Update
Microsoft Office XP Service Pack 3 Microsoft Publisher 2002 Service Pack 3\ (KB2284692) Remote Code Execution Important MS10-023
Microsoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3 Microsoft Publisher 2003 Service Pack 3\ (KB2284695) Remote Code Execution Important MS10-036
Microsoft Office 2007 Service Pack 2 Microsoft Publisher 2007 Service Pack 2\ (KB2284697) Remote Code Execution Important MS10-036
Microsoft Office 2010 (32-bit editions) Microsoft Publisher 2010 (32-bit editions)\ (KB2409055) Remote Code Execution Important None
Microsoft Office 2010 (64-bit editions) Microsoft Publisher 2010 (64-bit editions)\ (KB2409055) Remote Code Execution Important None

Where are the file information details? 
Refer to the reference tables in the Security Update Deployment section for the location of the file information details.

Why does this update address several reported security vulnerabilities? 
This update contains support for several vulnerabilities because the modifications that are required to address these issues are located in related files. Instead of having to install several updates that are almost the same, customers need to install this update only.

How are Microsoft Office standalone programs affected by the vulnerabilities? 
A Microsoft Office standalone program is affected with the same severity rating as the corresponding component in a Microsoft Office Suite. For example, a standalone installation of Microsoft Publisher is affected with the same severity rating as an installation of Microsoft Publisher that was delivered with a Microsoft Office Suite.

The Microsoft Office component discussed in this article is part of the Microsoft Office Suite that I have installed on my system; however, I did not choose to install this specific component. Will I be offered this update? 
Yes, if the component discussed in this bulletin was delivered with the version of the Microsoft Office Suite installed on your system, the system will be offered updates for it whether the component is installed or not. The detection logic used to scan for affected systems is designed to check for updates for all components that were delivered with the particular Microsoft Office Suite and to offer the updates to a system. Users who choose not to apply an update for a component that is not installed, but is delivered with their version of the Microsoft Office Suite, will not increase the security risk of that system. On the other hand, users who do choose to install the update will not have a negative impact on the security or performance of a system.

Does the offer to update a non-vulnerable version of Microsoft Office constitute an issue in the Microsoft update mechanism? 
No, the update mechanism is functioning correctly in that it detects a lower version of the files on the system than in the update package and thus, offers the update.

I am using an older release of the software discussed in this security bulletin. What should I do? 
The affected software listed in this bulletin have been tested to determine which releases are affected. Other releases are past their support life cycle. For more information about the product lifecycle, visit the Microsoft Support Lifecycle Web site.

It should be a priority for customers who have older releases of the software to migrate to supported releases to prevent potential exposure to vulnerabilities. To determine the support lifecycle for your software release, see Select a Product for Lifecycle Information. For more information about service packs for these software releases, see Lifecycle Supported Service Packs.

Customers who require custom support for older software must contact their Microsoft account team representative, their Technical Account Manager, or the appropriate Microsoft partner representative for custom support options. Customers without an Alliance, Premier, or Authorized Contract can contact their local Microsoft sales office. For contact information, visit the Microsoft Worldwide Information Web site, select the country in the Contact Information list, and then click Go to see a list of telephone numbers. When you call, ask to speak with the local Premier Support sales manager. For more information, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle Policy FAQ.

Vulnerability Information

Severity Ratings and Vulnerability Identifiers

The following severity ratings assume the potential maximum impact of the vulnerability. For information regarding the likelihood, within 30 days of this security bulletin's release, of the exploitability of the vulnerability in relation to its severity rating and security impact, please see the Exploitability Index in the December bulletin summary. For more information, see Microsoft Exploitability Index.

Affected Software Size Value Heap Corruption in pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2569 Heap Overrun in pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2570 Memory Corruption Due To Invalid Index Into Array in Pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2571 Microsoft Publisher Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3954 Array Indexing Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3955 Aggregate Severity Rating
Microsoft Publisher 2002 Service Pack 3 Important \ Remote Code Execution Important \ Remote Code Execution Important \ Remote Code Execution Important \ Remote Code Execution Important \ Remote Code Execution Important
Microsoft Publisher 2003 Service Pack 3 Important \ Remote Code Execution Important \ Remote Code Execution Important \ Remote Code Execution Important \ Remote Code Execution Not applicable Important
Microsoft Publisher 2007 Service Pack 2 Important \ Remote Code Execution Important \ Remote Code Execution Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Important
Microsoft Publisher 2010 (32-bit editions) Not applicable Important \ Remote Code Execution Not applicable Important \ Remote Code Execution Not applicable Important
Microsoft Publisher 2010 (64-bit editions) Not applicable Important \ Remote Code Execution Not applicable Important \ Remote Code Execution Not applicable Important

Size Value Heap Corruption in pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2569

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Microsoft Publisher parses Publisher files. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by creating a specially crafted Publisher file that could be included as an e-mail attachment, or hosted on a specially crafted or compromised Web site, and then convincing the user to open the specially crafted Publisher file. If a user were logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less affected than users who operate with administrative user rights.

To view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-2569.

Mitigating Factors for Size Value Heap Corruption in pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2569

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

  • The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
  • An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
  • In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker’s Web site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Publisher file.

Workarounds for Size Value Heap Corruption in pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2569

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

  • Disable the Publisher Converter DLL

    Run the following commands from a command prompt as an administrator:

    For 32-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\<office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /E /P everyone:N

    Note For <office version>, enter the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office component in your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, and "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007. To verify the version, open this Microsoft Office component and click Help.

    For 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /E /P everyone:N

    Note For <office version>, enter the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office component in your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, and "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007. To verify the version, open this Microsoft Office component and click Help.

    For 32-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, and Windows 7:

    takeown /f "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll"
    icacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /save %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT
    icacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /deny everyone(F)
    

    Note For <office version>, enter the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office component in your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, and "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007. To verify the version, open this Microsoft Office component and click Help.

    For 64-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2:

    takeown /f "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll"
    icacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /save %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT
    icacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /deny everyone (F)
    

    Note For <office version>, enter the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office component in your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, and "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007. To verify the version, open this Microsoft Office component and click Help.

    Impact of workaround. Users who have disabled the Publisher Converter DLL will not be able to open Publisher files created in versions earlier than Microsoft Publisher 2007.

    How to undo the workaround:

    Run the following command from a command prompt as an administrator:

    For 32-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /E /R everyone

    Note For <office version>, enter the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office component in your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, and "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007. To verify the version, open this Microsoft Office component and click Help.

    For 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /E /R everyone

    Note For <office version>, enter the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office component in your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, and "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007. To verify the version, open this Microsoft Office component and click Help.

    For 32-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, and Windows 7:

    icacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\" /restore %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT

    Note For <office version>, enter the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office component in your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, and "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007. To verify the version, open this Microsoft Office component and click Help.

    For 64-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2:

    icacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\" /restore %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT

    Note For <office version>, enter the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office component in your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, and "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007. To verify the version, open this Microsoft Office component and click Help.

  • Do not open Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources

    Do not open Publisher files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.

FAQ for Size Value Heap Corruption in pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2569

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
The vulnerability exists in the way Microsoft Publisher parses specially crafted Publisher files.

What is pubconv.dll? 
Publisher Converter DLL is used by Microsoft Publisher to open Publisher files created in versions earlier than Microsoft Publisher 2007.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code as the logged-on user. If a user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker could take complete control of the affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted Publisher file with an affected version of Microsoft Publisher.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted Publisher file to the user and by convincing the user to open the file.

In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker would have to host a Web site that contains a Publisher file that is used to attempt to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have no way to force users to visit a specially crafted Web site. Instead, an attacker would have to convince them to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes them to the attacker's site and then convince them to open the specially crafted Publisher file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where Microsoft Publisher is used, including workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way that Microsoft Publisher parses specially crafted Publisher files.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Heap Overrun in pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2570

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Microsoft Publisher parses Publisher files. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by creating a specially crafted Publisher file that could be included as an e-mail attachment, or hosted on a specially crafted or compromised Web site, and then convincing the user to open the specially crafted Publisher file. If a user were logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less affected than users who operate with administrative user rights.

To view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-2570.

Mitigating Factors for Heap Overrun in pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2570

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

  • The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
  • An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
  • In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker’s Web site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Publisher file.

Workarounds for Heap Overrun in pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2570

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

  • Disable the Publisher Converter DLL

    Run the following command from a command prompt as an administrator:

    For 32-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /E /P everyone:N

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007, and "Office14" for Microsoft Publisher 2010.

    For 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /E /P everyone:N

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007, and "Office14" for Microsoft Publisher 2010.

    For 32- bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, and Windows 7:

    takeown /f "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll"
    icacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /save %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT
    icacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /deny everyone(F)
    

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007, and "Office14" for Microsoft Publisher 2010.

    For 64-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2:

    takeown /f "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll"
    icacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /save %TEMP%\ PUBCONV_ACL.TXT
    icacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /deny everyone (F)
    

    Note For <office version>, enter the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office component in your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, and "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007. To verify the version, open this Microsoft Office component and click Help.

    Impact of workaround. Users who have disabled the Publisher Converter DLL will not be able to open Publisher files created in versions earlier than Microsoft Publisher 2007.

    How to undo the workaround:

    Run the following command from a command prompt as an administrator:

    For 32-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /E /R everyone

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007, and "Office14" for Microsoft Publisher 2010.

    For 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /E /R everyone

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007, and "Office14" for Microsoft Publisher 2010.

    For 32-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, and Windows 7:

    icacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\" /restore %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007, and "Office14" for Microsoft Publisher 2010.

    For 64-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2:

    icacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\" /restore %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT

    Note For <office version>, enter the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office component in your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, and "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007. To verify the version, open this Microsoft Office component and click Help.

  • Do not open Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources

    Do not open Publisher files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.

FAQ for Heap Overrun in pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2570

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
The vulnerability exists in the way Microsoft Publisher parses specially crafted Publisher files.

What is pubconv.dll? 
Publisher Converter DLL is used by Microsoft Publisher to open Publisher files created in versions earlier than Microsoft Publisher 2007.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code as the logged-on user. If a user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker could take complete control of the affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted Publisher file with Microsoft Publisher.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted Publisher file to the user and by convincing the user to open the file.

In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker would have to host a Web site that contains a Publisher file that is used to attempt to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have no way to force users to visit a specially crafted Web site. Instead, an attacker would have to convince them to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes them to the attacker's site and then convince them to open the specially crafted Publisher file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where Microsoft Publisher is used, including workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way that Microsoft Publisher parses specially crafted Publisher files.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Memory Corruption Due To Invalid Index Into Array in Pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2571

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Microsoft Publisher opens Publisher files. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by creating a specially crafted Publisher file that could be included as an e-mail attachment, or hosted on a specially crafted or compromised Web site, and then convincing the user to open the specially crafted Publisher file. If a user were logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less affected than users who operate with administrative user rights.

To view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-2571.

Mitigating Factors for Memory Corruption Due To Invalid Index Into Array in Pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2571

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

  • The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
  • An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
  • In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker’s Web site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Publisher file.

Workarounds for Memory Corruption Due To Invalid Index Into Array in Pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2571

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

  • Disable the Publisher Converter DLL

    Run the following command from a command prompt as an administrator:

    For 32-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /E /P everyone:N

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007, and "Office14" for Microsoft Publisher 2010.

    For 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /E /P everyone:N

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007, and "Office14" for Microsoft Publisher 2010.

    For 32-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, and Windows 7:

    takeown /f "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll"
    icacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll" /save %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT
    icacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll" /deny everyone(F)
    

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007, and "Office14" for Microsoft Publisher 2010.

    For 64-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2:

    takeown /f "<64BIT_PATH_AND_FILENAME>"
    icacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll" /save %TEMP%\ PUBCONV_ACL.TXT
    icacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll" /deny everyone (F)
    

    Note For <office version>, enter the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office component in your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002, "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003, and "Office12" for Microsoft Publisher 2007. To verify the version, open this Microsoft Office component and click Help.

    Impact of workaround. Users who have disabled the Publisher Converter DLL will not be able to open Publisher files created in versions earlier than Microsoft Publisher 2007.

    How to undo the workaround:

    Run the following command from a command prompt as an administrator:

    For 32-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /E /R everyone

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002 and "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003.

    For 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\pubconv.dll" /E /R everyone

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002 and "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003.

    For 32-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, and Windows 7:

    icacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\" /restore %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002 and "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003.

    For 64-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2:

    icacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\</office><office version="version">\" /restore %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT

    Note Use the version of the appropriate Microsoft Office software for your system, such as "Office10" for Microsoft Publisher 2002 and "Office11" for Microsoft Publisher 2003.

  • Do not open Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources

    Do not open Publisher files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.

FAQ for Memory Corruption Due To Invalid Index Into Array in Pubconv.dll Vulnerability - CVE-2010-2571

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
The vulnerability exists in the way Microsoft Publisher parses Publisher 97 format files.

What is pubconv.dll? 
Publisher Converter DLL is used by Microsoft Publisher to open Publisher files created in versions earlier than Microsoft Publisher 2007.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code as the logged-on user. If a user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker could take complete control of the affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted Publisher file with Microsoft Publisher.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted Publisher file to the user and by convincing the user to open the file.

In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker would have to host a Web site that contains a Publisher file that is used to attempt to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have no way to force users to visit a specially crafted Web site. Instead, an attacker would have to convince them to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes them to the attacker's site and then convince them to open the specially crafted Publisher file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where Microsoft Publisher is used, including workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way that Microsoft Publisher converts Publisher 97 format files.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Microsoft Publisher Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3954

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Microsoft Publisher opens Publisher files. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by creating a specially crafted Publisher file that could be included as an e-mail attachment, or hosted on a specially crafted or compromised Web site, and then convincing the user to open the specially crafted Publisher file. If a user were logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less affected than users who operate with administrative user rights.

To view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3954.

Mitigating Factors for Microsoft Publisher Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3954

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

  • The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
  • An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
  • In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker’s Web site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Publisher file.

Workarounds for Microsoft Publisher Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3954

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

  • Do not open Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources

    Do not open Publisher files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.

FAQ for Microsoft Publisher Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3954

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
The vulnerability exists in the way that Microsoft Publisher parses specially crafted Publisher files.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code as the logged-on user. If a user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker could take complete control of the affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted Publisher file with Microsoft Publisher.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted Publisher file to the user and by convincing the user to open the file.

In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker would have to host a Web site that contains a Publisher file that is used to attempt to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have no way to force users to visit a specially crafted Web site. Instead, an attacker would have to convince them to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes them to the attacker's site and then convince them to open the specially crafted Publisher file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where Microsoft Publisher is used, including workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way that Microsoft Publisher parses specially crafted Publisher files.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Array Indexing Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3955

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Microsoft Publisher opens Publisher files. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by creating a specially crafted Publisher file that could be included as an e-mail attachment, or hosted on a specially crafted or compromised Web site, and then convincing the user to open the specially crafted Publisher file. If a user were logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less affected than users who operate with administrative user rights.

To view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3955.

Mitigating Factors for Array Indexing Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3955

Mitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:

  • The vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.
  • An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.
  • In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker’s Web site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Publisher file.

Workarounds for Array Indexing Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3955

Workaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:

  • Disable the Publisher Converter DLL

    Run the following command from a command prompt as an administrator:

    For 32-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll" /E /P everyone:N

    For 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll" /E /P everyone:N

    For 32-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, and Windows 7:

    takeown /f "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll"
    icacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll" /save %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT
    icacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll" /deny everyone(F)
    

    For 64-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2:

    takeown /f "<64BIT_PATH_AND_FILENAME>"
    icacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll" /save %TEMP%\ PUBCONV_ACL.TXT
    icacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll" /deny everyone (F)
    

    Impact of workaround. Users who have disabled the Publisher Converter DLL will not be able to open Publisher files created in versions earlier than Microsoft Publisher 2007.

    How to undo the workaround:

    Run the following command from a command prompt as an administrator:

    For 32-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll" /E /R everyone

    For 64-bit editions of Windows XP and Windows Server 2003:

    cacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\office10\pubconv.dll" /E /R everyone

    For 32-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, and Windows 7, run the following command from an elevated command prompt:

    icacls "c:\program files\Microsoft Office\office10\" /restore %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT

    For 64-bit editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2:

    icacls "%ProgramFiles(86)%\Microsoft Office\office10\" /restore %TEMP%\PUBCONV_ACL.TXT

  • Do not open Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources

    Do not open Publisher files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.

FAQ for Array Indexing Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3955

What is the scope of the vulnerability? 
This is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

What causes the vulnerability? 
The vulnerability exists in the way that Microsoft Publisher parses specially crafted Publisher files.

What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code as the logged-on user. If a user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker could take complete control of the affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.

How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? 
This vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted Publisher file with Microsoft Publisher.

In an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted Publisher file to the user and by convincing the user to open the file.

In a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker would have to host a Web site that contains a Publisher file that is used to attempt to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have no way to force users to visit a specially crafted Web site. Instead, an attacker would have to convince them to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes them to the attacker's site and then convince them to open the specially crafted Publisher file.

What systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? 
Systems where Microsoft Publisher is used, including workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.

What does the update do? 
This update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way that Microsoft Publisher parses specially crafted Publisher files.

When this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? 
No. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.

When this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? 
No. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.

Update Information

Detection and Deployment Tools and Guidance

Security Central

Manage the software and security updates you need to deploy to the servers, desktop, and mobile systems in your organization. For more information see the TechNet Update Management Center. The Microsoft TechNet Security Web site provides additional information about security in Microsoft products.

Security updates are available from Microsoft Update and Windows Update. Security updates are also available from the Microsoft Download Center. You can find them most easily by doing a keyword search for "security update."

For customers of Microsoft Office for Mac, Microsoft AutoUpdate for Mac can help keep your Microsoft software up to date. For more information about using Microsoft AutoUpdate for Mac, see Check for software updates automatically.

Finally, security updates can be downloaded from the Microsoft Update Catalog. The Microsoft Update Catalog provides a searchable catalog of content made available through Windows Update and Microsoft Update, including security updates, drivers and service packs. By searching using the security bulletin number (such as, "MS07-036"), you can add all of the applicable updates to your basket (including different languages for an update), and download to the folder of your choosing. For more information about the Microsoft Update Catalog, see the Microsoft Update Catalog FAQ.

Detection and Deployment Guidance

Microsoft provides detection and deployment guidance for security updates. This guidance contains recommendations and information that can help IT professionals understand how to use various tools for detection and deployment of security updates. For more information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 961747.

Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer

Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) allows administrators to scan local and remote systems for missing security updates as well as common security misconfigurations. For more information about MBSA, visit Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer.

The following table provides the MBSA detection summary for this security update.

Software MBSA
Microsoft Office XP Service Pack 3 Yes
Microsoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3 Yes
Microsoft Office 2007 Service Pack 2 Yes
Microsoft Office 2010 (32-bit editions) Yes
Microsoft Office 2010 (64-bit editions) Yes

Note For customers using legacy software not supported by the latest release of MBSA, Microsoft Update, and Windows Server Update Services, please visit Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer and reference the Legacy Product Support section on how to create comprehensive security update detection with legacy tools.

Windows Server Update Services

Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) enables information technology administrators to deploy the latest Microsoft product updates to computers that are running the Windows operating system. For more information about how to deploy security updates using Windows Server Update Services, see the TechNet article, Windows Server Update Services.

Systems Management Server

The following table provides the SMS detection and deployment summary for this security update.

Software SMS 2.0 SMS 2003 with SUIT SMS 2003 with ITMU Configuration Manager 2007
Microsoft Office XP Service Pack 3 No No Yes Yes
Microsoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3 No No Yes Yes
Microsoft Office 2007 Service Pack 2 No No Yes Yes
Microsoft Office 2010 (32-bit editions) No No Yes Yes
Microsoft Office 2010 (64-bit editions) No No Yes Yes

For SMS 2.0 and SMS 2003, the Security Update Inventory Tool (SUIT) can be used by SMS to detect security updates. See also Downloads for Systems Management Server 2.0.

For SMS 2003, the SMS 2003 Inventory Tool for Microsoft Updates (ITMU) can be used by SMS to detect security updates that are offered by Microsoft Update and that are supported by Windows Server Update Services. For more information about the SMS 2003 ITMU, see SMS 2003 Inventory Tool for Microsoft Updates. For more information about SMS scanning tools, see SMS 2003 Software Update Scanning Tools. See also Downloads for Systems Management Server 2003.

System Center Configuration Manager 2007 uses WSUS 3.0 for detection of updates. For more information about Configuration Manager 2007 Software Update Management, visit System Center Configuration Manager 2007.

For more information about SMS, visit the SMS Web site.

For more detailed information, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 910723: Summary list of monthly detection and deployment guidance articles.

Note If you have used an Administrative Installation Point (AIP) for deploying Office XP or Office 2003, you may not be able to deploy the update using SMS if you have updated the AIP from the original baseline. For more information, see the Office Administrative Installation Point heading in this section.

Office Administrative Installation Point

If you installed your application from a server location, the server administrator must update the server location with the administrative update and deploy that update to your system.

Update Compatibility Evaluator and Application Compatibility Toolkit

Updates often write to the same files and registry settings required for your applications to run. This can trigger incompatibilities and increase the time it takes to deploy security updates. You can streamline testing and validating Windows updates against installed applications with the Update Compatibility Evaluator components included with Application Compatibility Toolkit.

The Application Compatibility Toolkit (ACT) contains the necessary tools and documentation to evaluate and mitigate application compatibility issues before deploying Microsoft Windows Vista, a Windows Update, a Microsoft Security Update, or a new version of Windows Internet Explorer in your environment.

Security Update Deployment

Affected Software

For information about the specific security update for your affected software, click the appropriate link:

Publisher 2002 (all editions)

Reference Table

The following table contains the security update information for this software. You can find additional information in the subsection, Deployment Information, in this section.

Inclusion in Future Service Packs There are no more service packs planned for this software. The update for this issue may be included in a future update rollup.
Deployment
Installing without user intervention officeXP-KB2284692-FullFile-ENU.exe /q:a
Installing without restarting officeXP-KB2284692-FullFile-ENU.exe /r:n
Update log file Not applicable
Further information For detection and deployment, see the earlier section, Detection and Deployment Tools and Guidance. \ \ For features you can selectively install, see the Office Features for Administrative Installations subsection in this section.
Restart Requirement
Restart required? In some cases, this update does not require a restart. If the required files are being used, this update will require a restart. If this behavior occurs, a message appears that advises you to restart.\ \ To help reduce the chance that a restart will be required, stop all affected services and close all applications that may use the affected files prior to installing the security update. For more information about the reasons why you may be prompted to restart, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 887012.
HotPatching Not applicable
Removal Information Use Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel.\ \ Note When you remove this update, you may be prompted to insert the Microsoft Office XP CD in the CD drive. Additionally, you may not have the option to uninstall the update from the Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel. There are several possible causes for this issue. For more information about the removal, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 903771.
File Information See Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 2284692
Registry Key Verification Not applicable

Office Features

The following table contains the list of feature names (case sensitive) that must be reinstalled for the update. To install all features, you can use REINSTALL=ALL or you can install the following features:

Product Feature
PIPC1, PPT, PROPLUS, PRO, STD, STDEDU, WORD, EXCEL MSDrawFiles
PUB, SBE PubPrimary, MSDrawFiles

Note Administrators working in managed environments can find complete resources for deploying Office updates in an organization at the Office Admin Update Center. At that site, scroll down and look under the Update Resources section for the software version you are updating. The Windows Installer Documentation also provides more information about the parameters supported by Windows Installer.

Deployment Information

Installing the Update

You can install the update from the appropriate download link in the Affected and Non-Affected Software section. If you installed your application from a server location, the server administrator must instead update the server location with the administrative update and deploy that update to your system. For more information about Administrative Installation Points, refer to the Office Administrative Installation Point information in the Detection and deployment Tools and Guidance subsection.

This security update requires that Windows Installer 2.0 or later be installed on the system. All supported versions of Windows include Windows Installer 2.0 or a later version.

To install the 2.0 or later version of Windows Installer, visit one of the following Microsoft Web sites:

For more information about the terminology that appears in this bulletin, such as hotfix, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 824684.

This security update supports the following setup switches.

Switch Description
/q Specifies quiet mode, or suppresses prompts, when files are being extracted.
/q:u Specifies user-quiet mode, which presents some dialog boxes to the user.
/q:a Specifies administrator-quiet mode, which does not present any dialog boxes to the user.
/t:path Specifies the target folder for extracting files.
/c Extracts the files without installing them. If /t:path is not specified, you are prompted for a target folder.
/c:path Overrides the install command that is defined by author. Specifies the path and name of the Setup.inf or .exe file.
/r:n Never restarts the system after installation.
/r:I Prompts the user to restart the system if a restart is required, except when used with /q:a.
/r:a Always restarts the system after installation.
/r:s Restarts the system after installation without prompting the user.
/n:v No version checking - Install the program over any earlier version.

Note You can combine these switches into one command. For backward compatibility, the security update also supports the setup switches that the earlier version of the Setup program uses. For more information about the supported installation switches, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 262841.

Removing the Update

To remove this security update, use the Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel. Note When you remove this update, you may be prompted to insert the Microsoft Office XP CD in the CD drive. Additionally, you may not have the option to uninstall the update from the Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel. There are several possible causes for this issue. For more information about the removal, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 903771.

Verifying That the Update Has Been Applied

  • Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer

    To verify that a security update has been applied to an affected system, you may be able to use the Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) tool. See the section, Detection and Deployment Tools and Guidance, earlier in this bulletin for more information.

  • File Version Verification

    Because there are several versions and editions of Microsoft Windows, the following steps may be different on your system. If they are, see your product documentation to complete these steps.

    1. Click Start, and then click Search.
    2. In the Search Results pane, click All files and folders under Search Companion.
    3. In the All or part of the file name box, type a file name from the appropriate file information table, and then click Search.
    4. In the list of files, right-click a file name from the appropriate file information table, and then click Properties.
      Note Depending on the version of the operating system or programs installed, some of the files that are listed in the file information table may not be installed.
    5. On the Version tab, determine the version of the file that is installed on your system by comparing it to the version that is documented in the appropriate file information table.
      Note Attributes other than the file version may change during installation. Comparing other file attributes to the information in the file information table is not a supported method of verifying that the update has been applied. Also, in certain cases, files may be renamed during installation. If the file or version information is not present, use one of the other available methods to verify update installation.

Publisher 2003 (all editions)

Reference Table

The following table contains the security update information for this software. You can find additional information in the Deployment Information subsection below.

Inclusion in Future Service Packs There are no more service packs planned for this software. The update for this issue may be included in a future update rollup.
Deployment
Installing without user intervention office2003-KB2284695-FullFile-ENU.exe /q:a
Installing without restarting office2003-KB2284695-FullFile-ENU.exe /r:n
Update log file Not applicable
Further information For detection and deployment, see the earlier section, Detection and Deployment Tools and Guidance. \ \ For features you can selectively install, see the Office Features for Administrative Installations subsection in this section.
Restart Requirement
Restart required? In some cases, this update does not require a restart. If the required files are being used, this update will require a restart. If this behavior occurs, a message appears that advises you to restart.\ \ To help reduce the chance that a restart will be required, stop all affected services and close all applications that may use the affected files prior to installing the security update. For more information about the reasons why you may be prompted to restart, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 887012.
HotPatching Not applicable
Removal Information Use Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel.\ \ Note When you remove this update, you may be prompted to insert the Microsoft Office 2003 CD in the CD drive. Additionally, you may not have the option to uninstall the update from the Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel. There are several possible causes for this issue. For more information about the removal, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 903771.
File Information See Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 2284695
Registry Key Verification Not applicable

Office Features

The following table contains the list of feature names (case sensitive) that must be reinstalled for the update. To install all features, you can use REINSTALL=ALL or you can install the following features:

Product Feature
PRO11SB, PROI11, PRO11, PUB11, STDP11 PubPrimary

Note Administrators working in managed environments can find complete resources for deploying Office updates in an organization at the Office Admin Update Center. At that site, scroll down and look under the Update Resources section for the software version you are updating. The Windows Installer Documentation also provides more information about the parameters supported by Windows Installer.

Deployment Information

Installing the Update

You can install the update from the appropriate download link in the Affected and Non-Affected Software section. If you installed your application from a server location, the server administrator must instead update the server location with the administrative update and deploy that update to your system. For more information about Administrative Installation Points, refer to the Office Administrative Installation Point information in the Detection and deployment Tools and Guidance subsection.

This security update requires that Windows Installer 2.0 or later be installed on the system. All supported versions of Windows include Windows Installer 2.0 or a later version.

To install the 2.0 or later version of Windows Installer, visit one of the following Microsoft Web sites:

For more information about the terminology that appears in this bulletin, such as hotfix, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 824684.

This security update supports the following setup switches.

Switch Description
/q Specifies quiet mode, or suppresses prompts, when files are being extracted.
/q:u Specifies user-quiet mode, which presents some dialog boxes to the user.
/q:a Specifies administrator-quiet mode, which does not present any dialog boxes to the user.
/t:path Specifies the target folder for extracting files.
/c Extracts the files without installing them. If /t:path is not specified, you are prompted for a target folder.
/c:path Overrides the install command that is defined by author. Specifies the path and name of the Setup.inf or .exe file.
/r:n Never restarts the system after installation.
/r:I Prompts the user to restart the system if a restart is required, except when used with /q:a.
/r:a Always restarts the system after installation.
/r:s Restarts the system after installation without prompting the user.
/n:v No version checking - Install the program over any earlier version.

Note You can combine these switches into one command. For backward compatibility, the security update also supports many of the setup switches that the earlier version of the Setup program uses. For more information about the supported installation switches, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 262841.

Removing the Update

To remove this security update, use the Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel.

Note When you remove this update, you may be prompted to insert the Microsoft Office 2003 CD in the CD drive. Additionally, you may not have the option to uninstall the update from the Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel. There are several possible causes for this issue. For more information about the removal, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 903771.

Verifying that the Update Has Been Applied

  • Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer

    To verify that a security update has been applied to an affected system, you may be able to use the Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) tool. See the section, Detection and Deployment Tools and Guidance, earlier in this bulletin for more information.

  • File Version Verification

    Because there are several editions of Microsoft Windows, the following steps may be different on your system. If they are, see your product documentation to complete these steps.

    1. Click Start and then enter an update file name in the Start Search box.
    2. When the file appears under Programs, right-click the file name and click Properties.
    3. On the General tab, compare the file size with the file information tables provided in the bulletin KB article.
    4. You can also click the Details tab and compare information, such as file version and date modified, with the file information tables provided in the bulletin KB article.
    5. Finally, you can also click the Previous Versions tab and compare file information for the previous version of the file with the file information for the new, or updated, version of the file.

Publisher 2007 (all editions)

Reference Table

The following table contains the security update information for this software. You can find additional information in the subsection, Deployment Information, in this section.

Inclusion in Future Service Packs The update for this issue will be included in a future service pack or update rollup
Deployment
Installing without user intervention publisher2007-kb2284697-fullfile-x86-glb.exe /passive
Installing without restarting publisher2007-kb2284697-fullfile-x86-glb.exe /norestart
Update log file Not applicable
Further information For detection and deployment, see the earlier section, Detection and Deployment Tools and Guidance.
Restart Requirement
Restart required? In some cases, this update does not require a restart. If the required files are being used, this update will require a restart. If this behavior occurs, a message appears that advises you to restart.\ \ To help reduce the chance that a restart will be required, stop all affected services and close all applications that may use the affected files prior to installing the security update. For more information about the reasons why you may be prompted to restart, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 887012.
HotPatching Not applicable
Removal Information Use Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel.
File Information See Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 2284697
Registry Key Verification Not applicable

Deployment Information

Installing the Update

You can install the update from the appropriate download link in the Affected and Non-Affected Software section. If you installed your application from a server location, the server administrator must instead update the server location with the administrative update and deploy that update to your system. For more information about Administrative Installation Points, refer to the Office Administrative Installation Point information in the Detection and deployment Tools and Guidance subsection.

This security update requires that Windows Installer 3.1 or later be installed on the system.

To install the 3.1 or later version of Windows Installer, visit one of the following Microsoft Web sites:

For more information about the terminology that appears in this bulletin, such as hotfix, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 824684.

This security update supports the following setup switches.

Switch Description
/? or /help Displays usage dialog.
/passive Specifies passive mode. Requires no user interaction; users see basic progress dialogs but cannot cancel.
/quiet Specifies quiet mode, or suppresses prompts, when files are being extracted.
/norestart Suppresses restarting the system if the update requires a restart.
/forcerestart Automatically restarts the system after applying the update, regardless of whether the update requires the restart.
/extract Extracts the files without installing them. You are prompted for a target folder.
/extract:<path> Overrides the install command that is defined by author. Specifies the path and name of the Setup.inf or .exe file.
/lang:<LCID> Forces the use of a specific language, when the update package supports that language.
/log:<log file> Enables logging, by both Vnox and Installer, during the update installation.

Note You can combine these switches into one command. For backward compatibility, the security update also supports many of the setup switches that the earlier version of the Setup program uses. For more information about the supported installation switches, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 262841.

Removing the Update

To remove this security update, use the Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel.

Note When you remove this update, you may be prompted to insert the 2007 Microsoft Office CD in the CD drive. Additionally, you may not have the option to uninstall the update from the Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel. There are several possible causes for this issue. For more information about the removal, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 903771.

Verifying that the Update Has Been Applied

  • Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer

    To verify that a security update has been applied to an affected system, you may be able to use the Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) tool. See the section, Detection and Deployment Tools and Guidance, earlier in this bulletin for more information.

  • File Version Verification

    Because there are several editions of Microsoft Windows, the following steps may be different on your system. If they are, see your product documentation to complete these steps.

    1. Click Start and then enter an update file name in the Start Search box.
    2. When the file appears under Programs, right-click the file name and click Properties.
    3. On the General tab, compare the file size with the file information tables provided in the bulletin KB article.
    4. You can also click the Details tab and compare information, such as file version and date modified, with the file information tables provided in the bulletin KB article.
    5. Finally, you can also click the Previous Versions tab and compare file information for the previous version of the file with the file information for the new, or updated, version of the file.

Publisher 2010 (all editions)

Reference Table

The following table contains the security update information for this software. You can find additional information in the subsection, Deployment Information, in this section.

Inclusion in Future Service Packs The update for this issue will be included in a future service pack or update rollup
Deployment
Installing without user intervention For Microsoft Publisher 2010 (32-bit editions):\ Publisher2010-kb2409055-fullfile-x86-glb.exe /passive
For Microsoft Publisher 2010 (64-bit editions):\ Publisher2010-kb2409055-fullfile-x64-glb.exe /passive
Installing without restarting For Microsoft Publisher 2010 (32-bit editions):\ Publisher2010-kb2409055-fullfile-x86-glb.exe /norestart
For Microsoft Publisher 2010 (64-bit editions):\ Publisher2010-kb2409055-fullfile-x64-glb.exe /norestart
Update log file Not applicable
Further information For detection and deployment, see the earlier section, Detection and Deployment Tools and Guidance.
Restart Requirement
Restart required? In some cases, this update does not require a restart. If the required files are being used, this update will require a restart. If this behavior occurs, a message appears that advises you to restart.\ \ To help reduce the chance that a restart will be required, stop all affected services and close all applications that may use the affected files prior to installing the security update. For more information about the reasons why you may be prompted to restart, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 887012.
HotPatching Not applicable
Removal Information Use Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel.
File Information See Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 2409055
Registry Key Verification Not applicable

Deployment Information

Installing the Update

You can install the update from the appropriate download link in the Affected and Non-Affected Software section. If you installed your application from a server location, the server administrator must instead update the server location with the administrative update and deploy that update to your system. For more information about Administrative Installation Points, refer to the Office Administrative Installation Point information in the Detection and deployment Tools and Guidance subsection.

This security update requires that Windows Installer 3.1 or later be installed on the system.

To install the 3.1 or later version of Windows Installer, visit one of the following Microsoft Web sites:

For more information about the terminology that appears in this bulletin, such as hotfix, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 824684.

This security update supports the following setup switches.

Switch Description
/? or /help Displays usage dialog.
/passive Specifies passive mode. Requires no user interaction; users see basic progress dialogs but cannot cancel.
/quiet Specifies quiet mode, or suppresses prompts, when files are being extracted.
/norestart Suppresses restarting the system if the update requires a restart.
/forcerestart Automatically restarts the system after applying the update, regardless of whether the update requires the restart.
/extract Extracts the files without installing them. You are prompted for a target folder.
/extract:<path> Overrides the install command that is defined by author. Specifies the path and name of the Setup.inf or .exe file.
/lang:<LCID> Forces the use of a specific language, when the update package supports that language.
/log:<log file> Enables logging, by both Vnox and Installer, during the update installation.

Note You can combine these switches into one command. For backward compatibility, the security update also supports many of the setup switches that the earlier version of the Setup program uses. For more information about the supported installation switches, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 262841.

Removing the Update

To remove this security update, use the Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel.

Note When you remove this update, you may be prompted to insert the 2007 Microsoft Office CD in the CD drive. Additionally, you may not have the option to uninstall the update from the Add or Remove Programs tool in Control Panel. There are several possible causes for this issue. For more information about the removal, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 903771.

Verifying that the Update Has Been Applied

  • Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer

    To verify that a security update has been applied to an affected system, you may be able to use the Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) tool. See the section, Detection and Deployment Tools and Guidance, earlier in this bulletin for more information.

  • File Version Verification

    Because there are several editions of Microsoft Windows, the following steps may be different on your system. If they are, see your product documentation to complete these steps.

    1. Click Start and then enter an update file name in the Start Search box.
    2. When the file appears under Programs, right-click the file name and click Properties.
    3. On the General tab, compare the file size with the file information tables provided in the bulletin KB article.
    4. You can also click the Details tab and compare information, such as file version and date modified, with the file information tables provided in the bulletin KB article.
    5. Finally, you can also click the Previous Versions tab and compare file information for the previous version of the file with the file information for the new, or updated, version of the file.

Other Information

Acknowledgments

Microsoft thanks the following for working with us to help protect customers:

Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP)

To improve security protections for customers, Microsoft provides vulnerability information to major security software providers in advance of each monthly security update release. Security software providers can then use this vulnerability information to provide updated protections to customers via their security software or devices, such as antivirus, network-based intrusion detection systems, or host-based intrusion prevention systems. To determine whether active protections are available from security software providers, please visit the active protections Web sites provided by program partners, listed in Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP) Partners.

Support

  • Customers in the U.S. and Canada can receive technical support from Security Support or 1-866-PCSAFETY. There is no charge for support calls that are associated with security updates. For more information about available support options, see Microsoft Help and Support.
  • International customers can receive support from their local Microsoft subsidiaries. There is no charge for support that is associated with security updates. For more information about how to contact Microsoft for support issues, visit the International Support Web site.

Disclaimer

The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.

Revisions

  • V1.0 (December 14, 2010): Bulletin published.

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